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I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2003, the United States, Canada, and Argentina initiated
dispute settlement procedures at the World Trade Organization (WTO) against
the European Communities (EC) for delaying approvals of genetically
modified (GM) crops within its borders.' A dispute settlement panel has
convened to settle this matter, European Communities-Measures Affecting
the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (Biotech Products), and the
parties began submitting written complaints in May 2004. The dispute
implicates not only technical concerns about barriers to trade but also political
questions about democratic participation in the design and operation of the
WTO.2 Its resolution will have consequences for the global development of
agricultural biotechnology, the democratic regulation of risks in world trade,
and, not least, the WTO's very legitimacy as an institution of global
governance.3
As the U.S. submission in this case makes clear, the central legal issues
in Biotech Products involve the interpretation of important provisions of the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement),4 especially those portions concerning "scientific justification"
and "risk assessment."5 The latter is a crucial term underpinning the entire
1. The United States, Canada, and Argentina first called for consultations on May 14, 2003,
concerning Europe's alleged ad hoc moratorium on GM crops. On August 8 of that year, the three
countries each requested that a panel be formed to hear the dispute. Permanent Mission of the United
States to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, European Communities-Measures Affecting
the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the
United States, WT/DS291/23 (Aug. 8, 2003); Permanent Mission of Canada to the Chairman of the
Dispute Settlement Body, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Canada, WT/DS292/17 (Aug. 8, 2003);
Permanent Mission of Argentina to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, European
Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products: Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by Argentina, WT/DS293/17 (Aug. 8, 2003).
2. On the theme of legitimacy and democracy in international trade law, see, e.g., J.H.H.
Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of the Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External
Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 193 (2001) (acknowledging that
political legitimacy has become "an essential part" of international trade law); ROBERT HUDEC,
Concepts of Fairness in International Trade Law, in ESSAYS ON THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW 227 (1999); Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolafdis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why
Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE
MULTINATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227 (Robert B. Porter et al. eds., 2001).
3. See, e.g., Grant E. Isaac & William A. Kerr, Genetically Modified Organisms at the World
Trade Organization: A Harvest of Trouble, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 1083 (2003); Christian Joerges &
JAirgen Neyer, Politics, Risk Management, World Trade Organisation Governance and the Limits of
Legalisation, 30 SCI. & PUB. POL'Y 219 (2003).
4. Enacted in April 1994 as part of the agreement establishing the WTO, the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) covers and restricts the laws,
regulations, and other measures that WTO members impose in efforts to protect against food- and plant-
bome threats to animal, plant, and human health. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 27, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/15-sps.pdf [hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
5. Permanent Mission of the United States, First Submission of the United States in
European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS291, 292 & 293 (Apr. 21, 2004) [hereinafter First U.S. Submission]; SPS Agreement, supra note
4, art. 5.7 (allowing member states to impose provisional SPS measures "where relevant scientific
evidence is insufficient," but requiring that such members "seek to obtain the additional information
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free flow of trade in food products under the WTO's science-based
disciplines. 6 In Biotech Products, the U.S. Trade Representative has
challenged the scientific basis of European Union (EU)7 actions preventing
the import of GM crops and food products, alleging that reversals of GM
regulatory policy within the EU and its member states illustrate the EU's
departure from a fixed body of sound science and constitute "unreasonable" or
"undue delay" under the SPS Agreement. 8 The European Commission 9
focuses its argument on the safe harbor provision of SPS Article 5.7-which
permits members to impose provisional or precautionary measures under
certain circumstances-arguing that at the time of the regulatory decisions in
question, the scientific evidence was "insufficient" to perform an "adequate"
risk assessment. 10 If the dispute settlement panel decides that the European
actions do indeed constitute an "SPS measure,"" the decision will turn on the
interpretation of scientific sufficiency for adequate assessment of risks.
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the [SPS] measure accordingly within a
reasonable period of time") (emphasis added); id. art. 5.1, 5.4 (WTO members shall evaluate their SPS
measures "taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations. . . . With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the concept of
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection against risks to human life or health, or to
animal and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the
levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade") (emphasis added).
6. See Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the 'World Trans-Science
Organization': Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones
Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251, 277 (1998) (emphasizing that fact-finding panels under the SPS
Agreement "must adequately understand the nature of risk assessment, the pervasiveness of scientific
uncertainty, and the role of science policy").
7. Although the European Union (EU) has been a WTO member state since January 1995, it
is "known officially as the European Communities in WTO business." World Trade Organization,
Member Information: The European Communities and the WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/countriese/european communities e.htm. The Biotech Products
dispute arises from regulatory actions taken by the EU. Thus, references to official European actions in
this Article will be made to the EU. References to official WTO proceedings or actions, however, will
be to the EU or the EC, as appropriate.
8. See First U.S. Submission, supra note 5, at 17, 35, 50; SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art.
5; id. at Annex C(l)(a) (WTO members must ensure that any SPS measures "are undertaken and
completed without undue delay and in no less favourable manner for imported products than for like
domestic products") (emphasis added).
9. The European Commission, the executive body of the EU's supranational governmental
structure, consists of twenty commissioners nominated by the governments of the EU member countries
and approved by the European Parliament. For an overview of the emerging governmental structure in
Europe, see DAVID M. WOOD & BIROL A. YESILADA, THE EMERGING EUROPEAN UNION 1-10 (3d ed.
2004). Within the WTO, "while the member States coordinate their position in Brussels and Geneva, the
European Commission alone speaks for the EU and its members at almost all WTO meetings and in
almost all WTO affairs." World Trade Organization, Member Information: The European Communities
and the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/countries-e/european-communitiese.htm.
10. Permanent Delegation of the European Commission, First Written Submission by the
European Communities in European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, WT/DS291, 292 & 293 (May 17, 2004); SPS Agreement, supra note 4, Annex
C(1)(h) (when the specifications of a previously approved product change, member states must limit
their control and inspection procedures for the new product to those measures "necessary to determine
whether adequate confidence exists that the product still meets the regulations concerned") (emphasis
added); id. art. 5.7 (allowing provisional SPS measures in "cases where relevant scientific evidence is
insufficient").
11. The SPS Agreement defines a "sanitary or phytosanitary measure" as "any measure
applied (a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing
organisms; (b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks
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The outcome of Biotech Products carries profound implications for the
balance between state and global power and the relationship of science to
democracy. WTO adjudicators will define the extent to which particular
conceptions of sound science can be used to set boundaries on members'
precautionary health and environmental measures. How far will the WTO go
toward invoking the epistemic authority of sound science to overcome claims
based on national political authority? Who will dictate what scientific
authority actually stands for in a given case? At stake in the answers to these
questions are the very parameters of state self-determination with regard to
food biotechnology and risk-based decision-making-not just for the EU, but
for all WTO members. Furthermore, the ultimate Biotech Products decision
will also help construct international norms about the types of evidence that
justify a precautionary approach to regulation.
Judicial interpretations of these concepts will help settle ambiguities in
the SPS Agreement and existing case law regarding how the global trade
regime ought to balance the competing goals of trade liberalization and the
regulatory self-determination of WTO members. 12 Previous commentators
have been relatively sanguine about the utility of employing the sound science
concept to help harmonize national regulations and reduce disguised
restrictions on trade without trampling upon the value-based and
democratically enacted choices of member states. 13 This position presumes a
level of consensus on the meaning of sound science that is contradicted by the
Biotech Products case. Exactly how WTO judges apply disputed science to
their evaluation of a policy judgment or a precautionary environmental
measure, and whether or not such judgments interfere with cultural self-
determination, remain open questions.
Thus, Biotech Products is making explicit the legal and political
complexities inherent in the judicial review of risk-assessment science. Much
is at stake both for the trajectory of biotechnological development and also for
the WTO's legitimacy as an institution, since the issues raised by GM
organisms (GMOs) bear upon all matters of scientific justification and risk
assessment in international trade law.
This being so, it is vital to offer-and for the WTO to rely upon-a
characterization of the risk-assessment process and science-informed
policymaking that adequately embraces the results of current social science
scholarship and recent regulatory experience. In practice, effective and
reliable risk assessment diverges from the simple science-based models
promoted by the United States and other complaining members in the Biotech
arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages, or
feedstuffs; (c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks arising from
diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of
pests; or (d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests." SPS Agreement, supra note 4, Annex A, para. 1.
12. See, e.g, David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the
Trade and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (2001) (arguing that the failure of WTO
officials, members, and scholars to articulate a clear concept or definition of free trade-vacillating
between nondiscrimination and laissez-faire liberalism-has left the WTO unable to defend its
legitimacy, especially in the face of increasing tension with other legal regimes).
13. See, e.g., Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial
at the World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2329, 2330 (2000).
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Products case. 14 Social science and regulatory experience instead emphasize
that value judgments and public participation play an important role in
generating reliable and conclusive risk assessments, especially in new and
contested risk situations. Accordingly, WTO judges charged with interpreting
the SPS Agreement should use anti-protectionism as their guiding norm,
rather than fall back upon a singular conception of scientific sufficiency. This
orientation would not only foster coherent science-based policymaking but
would also be consistent with the spirit of the SPS Agreement-and the entire
postwar history of the trading regime.
This perspective on the proper approach to science-based trade
regulation yields recommendations for how WTO adjudicators should
approach their task in Biotech Products and future such cases. Specifically,
judges should adopt a procedural outlook, as described below, that takes into
account the proper role of national values and policy judgments in scientific
regulation. Especially important will be the further development of
jurisprudence under the Article 5.7 safe harbor. Interpreting Article 5.7 with
an anti-protectionist orientation that nevertheless recognizes the legitimacy of
public engagement in novel risk situations will be crucial if the WTO wishes
to preserve its political legitimacy. Biotech Products, therefore, affords the
trade body an opportunity to preserve a space for legitimate cultural
differences in risk assessment and technology policy within the trading
system. The European regulatory treatment of GMOs can and should be
deemed legitimate under Article 5.7 without damaging the anti-protectionist
tools of the SPS Agreement as a whole.
Part II of this Article provides factual background to the transatlantic
GMO dispute and an overview of the legal and political developments leading
up to the complaint brought against the EU at the WTO. It also lays out the
existing scholarship on the SPS Agreement's inherent tensions between a
sound science principle and democratic self-determination, suggesting that the
Biotech Products case will play a significant role in resolving these tensions.
Part III draws upon the substantial scholarship on risk analysis and the
recent international regulatory work on assessing risk. It provides an account
of science's role in policymaking that differs from earlier understandings, and
which can help lay the conceptual foundations for more legitimate risk-based
decision-making by WTO dispute settlement tribunals.
Part IV argues that the realities of risk assessment and public
participation in science policy militate against using SPS law to enforce a
particular conception of scientific sufficiency in risk-based decision-making.
An emphasis on anti-protectionism would be more consistent with the history
and goals of the trading regime, and could be implemented consistently with
the recognition that legitimate public concerns and values can inform risk
assessment.
14. See, e.g., Executive Summary of Oral Statement of the United States at the First
Substantive Meeting with the Panel: European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291, 292 & 293, para. 27 (June 17, 2004), available at
http://www.trade-environment.org/output/theme/tewto/us oral statementJune04 summary.pdf (failing
to acknowledge that public dialogue and values, along with existing scientific studies, might be
legitimate inputs into the original assessment of risks).
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Part V gives a general account of how WTO judges should handle risk-
based regulation in order to implement an anti-protectionist vision of the SPS
Agreement. It argues that a procedural approach-comprising the prudent use
of regulatory experts, an awareness of the diversity of risk situations and
definitions, and the recognition of valid public participation in regulatory
policy-will help judges negotiate the dual SPS Agreement goals of
disciplining protectionism and recognizing legitimate value differences.
Furthermore, this Part suggests how Article 5.7 and other science-based
provisions of the SPS Agreement can and should be interpreted-in light of
the text itself, existing WTO case law, and the anti-protectionist orientation of
the trade regime-such that genuine value divergence may be defended.
Although such an approach risks widening the avenues for national
protectionism under the veil of scientific regulation, careful judicial review
that permits only transparent and accountable risk-based regulations would
maintain the efficiency of global trade law in the short term, while building
institutional legitimacy for the WTO in the long term.
Finally, Part VI argues that GMOs fall into the class of risk situations
characterized by both low certainty and low consensus. The science
surrounding GMO products and technologies and the developing GMO risk-
assessment techniques are relatively immature, leading to substantial areas of
uncertainty. At the same time, with numerous international institutions
working on issues relating to GMOs, and with public input playing an
important role in GMO risk assessment to date, there is also a notable lack of
consensus on the topic. With certain provisos, this low certainty and low
consensus militate for allowing the EU a temporary safe harbor under Article
5.7.
II. BACKGROUND TO BIOTECH PRODUCTS
A. The Dispute
International trade in agricultural products accounts for nearly ten
percent of the total volume of world trade, 15 and in some parts of the world,
production of GM crops has been increasing sharply.16 At the same time,
regulatory polarization in the agricultural biotechnology sector threatens to
develop into a drawn-out trade conflict.
17
The current conflict traces back to choices made in the United States and
Europe in the mid-1980s about how to regulate emergent agricultural
15. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 103 (2003), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/rese/statise/its2003 e/its2003 e.pdf.
16. See Donald E. Buckingham & Peter W.B. Phillips, Hot Potato, Hot Potato: Regulating
Products of Biotechnology by the International Community, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 1, 1 (2001). One pro-
biotech nonprofit organization estimated a 15% production increase in GM crops in 2003 alone, with the
annual figure of 67.7 million hectares (167.3 acres) worldwide. CLIVE JAMES, INT'L SERV. FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, PREVIEW: GLOBAL STATUS OF COMMERCIALIZED
TRANSGENIC CROPS: 2003, available at http://www.isaaa.org/kc/CBTNews/press-release/briefs30/-
es_b30.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2004).
17. See generally, THOMAS BERNAUER, GENES, TRADE, AND REGULATION: THE SEEDS OF
CONFLICT IN FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY 44-66, 118-67 (2003); Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer,
Biotechnology: The Next Transatlantic Trade War?, 23 WASH. Q. 41, 42 (2000).
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biotechnologies. Generally speaking, policymakers faced a fundamental
choice about the appropriate criteria to use in regulatory decision-making-
whether to assess GM risk on the basis of the products themselves, or on the
basis of the underlying production processes. Genetic modification, or genetic
engineering, involves "the manipulation of an organism's genetic endowment
by introducing or eliminating specific genes through modem molecular
biology techniques." 18 Producing a GM crop involves transgenesis, the
transfer of genes from one species of plant, animal, or virus into another
organism.' 9 The "products approach" to regulating GMOs assumes that no
untoward risk occurs merely from applying this technology to agricultural
production. GMOs are subjected to stricter rules only when the end products
are not substantially equivalent to their conventional counterparts. In contrast,
the "process approach" rests on the idea that genetic engineering itself may
entail novel and unique risks to human health or the environment. Whereas
the United States has embraced the products approach to GM agriculture, the
European Union and its member states have tended to adopt the more
precautionary process approach. z In 1990, the European Council adopted the
first measure aimed specifically at controlling environmental aspects of
GMOs, the process-based Deliberate Release Directive 90/220/EEC.
2p
The inherent tensions between these two divergent regulatory
philosophies first produced open conflict in the 1990s, when the "genetic
modification of dietary staples such as corn and soybeans ... caused strong
22trade frictions" in transatlantic relations. In 1996, farmers in the United
States began growing Monsanto's GM soybeans.23 The new seeds had easily
passed regulatory muster in the United States, and the EU authorized their
import without segregation or labeling requirements under Directive
18. BIOTECH LIFE SCIENCE DICTIONARY, at http:/Ibiotech.icmb.utexas.edu/searchldict-
search.phtml?title=engineer; cf European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/18/EC, art. 2.2, 2001
O.J. (L 106) 4 (defining "genetically modified organism" for the purposes of all GMO regulation as "an
organism, with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way
that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination.").
19. FAO GLOSSARY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE (2003), at
http://www.fao.org/biotech/find-formalpha-n.asp.
20. See, e.g., BERNAUER, supra note 17, 44-65; Sheila Jasanoff, Product, Process, or
Programme: Three Cultures and the Regulation of Biotechnology, in RESISTANCE TO NEW
TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 311-31 (Martin
Bauer ed., 1995); David Vogel, Ships Passing in the Night: GMOs and the Politics of Risk Regulation in
Europe and the United States (2001), available at http://www.insead.fr/events/gmoworkshop/papers/-
1_Vogel.pdf.
21. Council Directive 90/220/EEC, art. 8.5, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15 (on the deliberate release of
genetically modified organisms); see also BERNAUER, supra note 17, at 45.
22. MARSHA A. ECHOLS, FOOD SAFETY AND THE WTO: THE INTERPLAY OF CULTURE,
SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 71 (2001); see also J. McNichol & J. Bensedrine, National Institutional
Contexts and Construction of Multilateral Governance Systems: US-EU Struggles Over Labeling Rules
for Genetically Modified Food (2001), available at http://www.insead.fr/events/gmoworkshop/papers/-
6_Bens McNichol.pdf. Note, however, that the first GM food marketed in the United States and
available for international trade was the Flavr Savr@ tomato. This breed was developed by Calgene, a
U.S. company, to ripen on the vine until red but not soft by suppressing a key enzyme that breaks down
pectin. See MICHAEL J. REISS & ROGER STRAUGHAN, IMPROVING NATURE? THE SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF
GENETIC ENGINEERING 132-36 (1996).
23. McNichol & Bensedrine, supra note 22, at 7.
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90/220/EEC in April 1996.24 "Almost immediately," however, "the European
decision ignited an insurgency against Monsanto's new crops and against GM
organisms more generally." 25 Through Eurocommerce (the organization
representing European retail, wholesale, and international trade interests) and
the European Community of Consumer Cooperatives (Eurocoop), "retailers
called very strongly for GMO labeling and segregation of products at the
source."
26
By 1998, public opposition to GM crops and food was growing across
Europe, whereas in the United States the issue had caused little such public
controversy. 27 European concerns about the risks of genetic modification to
human health and to the environment 28 resulted in both increased demand for
consumer choice and in an ongoing ethical discourse regarding genetic
tampering with nature. 29 In discussions about new imports of GM crops, a
number of EU member states expressed concern at the levels of uncertain %
surrounding such products and the potential harmful effects of such crops.
At a meeting of the EU Council of Environment Ministers in June 1999,
France, Denmark, Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg stated that they would block
new authorizations of GMOs until Directive 90/220/EEC was revised and
legislation had been put in place to cover labeling and traceability. Austria,
Belgium, Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden did not go
as far, but stated they would take a "thoroughly precautionary approach" in
dealing with new GMO authorizations.
31
As a result of this change in policy, EU member states granted no new
approvals of GMOs after 1998, giving rise to the charge of a de facto
European moratorium. In the meantime, the EU negotiated new environmental
and food-safety rules for GM crops, including: (1) the revised EU Deliberate
Release Directive (2001/18/EC) on environmental impacts, which came into
force in October 2002; 32 and (2) new EU Regulations 1829/2003 and
1830/2003 concerning the authorization, traceability, and labeling of GMOs
and GMO-derived products, which became law in September 2003 and went
into force in April 2004.33 This new regime now requires full traceability, and
24. Commission Decision 96/281/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 107), available at
http://www.biosafety.be/GB/Dir.Eur.GB/Market/96-281/96-281 .html.
25. McNichol & Bensedrine, supra note 22, at 8.
26. Id.
27. See George Gaskell et al., Worlds Apart? Public Opinion in Europe and the USA, in
BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE MAKING OF A GLOBAL CONTROVERSY 351 (Martin W. Bauer & George Gaskell
eds., 2002).
28. See generally id.
29. Id.
30. GENEWATCH UK, Briefing no. 25, THE GM DISPUTE AT THE WTO: FORCING GM FOODS
ON EUROPE? (2003), available at http://www.genewatch.org/Publications/briefs/brief25.pdf.
31. Council of Envtl. Ministers, Declarations Regarding the Proposal to Amend Directive
90/220/EEC on Genetically Modified Organisms, 2194th Council Meeting, June 24-25, 1999, at 24,
http://www.eel.nl/council/2194.pdf.
32. European Parliament & Council Directive 2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1, available at
http://www.biosafety.be/PDF/2001_18.pdf (adding the consideration of indirect effects in risk
assessment, a requirement for post-market monitoring, and a ten-year time limit on approval).
33. European Parliament & Council Regulation 1829/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/1268/1_26820031018en00010023.pdf; European
Parliament & Council Regulation 1830/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 24, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/1_268/1_26820031018en00240028.pdf. For an overview of these regulations and
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labels must accompany all GM-derived products, even if the final product
lacks foreign DNA or protein.
34
Under the WTO's dispute resolution process, the United States, Canada,
and Argentina first called for consultations concerning Europe's alleged
moratorium on GM crop imports on May 14, 2003.35 According to U.S. trade
officials, they believed such a challenge was necessary to discourage other
countries, especially those in the developing world, from adopting the
European regulatory approach.36 Talks at the WTO failed almost immediately,
and the United States, Canada, and Argentina each formally requested a
dispute settlement panel on August 7, 2003.37
In their formal requests for a panel, the complaining member states cited
three measures that, they argued, adversely affect exports of agricultural and
food products in violation of WTO law:
38
(1) "a moratorium on the approval of products of agricultural biotechnology" in which
"the EC has suspended consideration of applications for, or granting of, approval of
biotech products under the EC approval system";
(2) blockage under existing EC legislation of all "applications for placing [further]
biotech products on the market"; and
(3) the maintenance by EC member states of "national marketing and import bans on
biotech products even though those products have already been approved by the EC for
import and marketing in the EC"
39
Since the revision of the Deliberate Release Directive in late 2002 and
the 2004 implementation of the new EU labeling requirements, 40 the European
an initial assessment of the trade issues they raise, see Joanne Scott, European Regulation of GMOs and
the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 213 (2003).
34. GENEWATCH UK, supra note 30, at 3.
35. Permanent Mission of the United States, European Communities-Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products; Request for Consultations by the United States,
WT/DS29/1, G/L/627, G/SPS/GEN/397, G/AG/GEN/60, G/TBT/D/28 (May 20, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/dispusubjects-indexe.htm#gmos [hereinafter U.S.
Request for Consultations].
36. See PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. V. EU: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
TRADE ISSUES SURROUNDING GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD 11 (2003), at
http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/issuebriefs/europe.pdf [hereinafter PEW INITIATIVE, U.S. V. EU].
37. See supra note 1.
38. In their initial complaints, the United States, Canada, and Argentina claimed that these
measures are inconsistent with particular provisions of several WTO accords: the SPS Agreement; the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
31, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994), available at http://wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/legale.htm
[hereinafter GATT 1994]; the Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, available at http://wto.org/english/does e/legal-e/legal-e.htm; and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31,
available at http://wto.org/english/docs e/legale/legale.htm. For the provisions of the respective
agreements cited in the request for a panel, see PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, U.S. V.
EU, supra note 36, at 2. In the initial submission to the dispute settlement panel, however, the United
States relied exclusively on provisions of the SPS Agreement to make its claims. First US. Submission,
supra note 5.
39. US. Request for Consultations, supra note 35.
40. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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Commission has begun to receive new GMO applications. Bt-1 1 corn gained
Commission approval for human consumption (but not planting) in May 2004,
the first biotech product to get beyond the Commission since 1998.41 Yet
despite these developments, the complaining members in Biotech Products
have continued to pursue the case against the alleged moratorium under the
SPS Agreement.
B. The SPS Agreement, Sound Science, and Democracy in Trade Law
The SPS Agreement has been described as one of the most significant
achievements of the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations that
created the WTO. 42 The Agreement explicitly aims for regulatory
"harmonization" 43 in the sphere of food safety by requiring that WTO
members either adopt international health and safety standards or justify
deviant measures with risk-assessment analysis and scientific evidence. 44 At
the same time, the text explicitly affirms that members are free to adopt and
enforce all measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health," so long as such measures are not applied in a discriminatory way.45
These aspirations are given meaning and teeth in the science-based
provisions of the SPS Agreement, which supply judicial mechanisms for
distinguishing legitimate safety standards from illegitimate regulatory
measures. Biotech Products will largely turn on the WTO panel's
interpretation of risk assessment, scientific evidence, and the relationship
between them under the SPS Agreement. Article 2.2 requires members to
ensure that each SPS measure is "based on scientific principles and is not
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence." 46 Measures based on
existing international standards are deemed to satisfy both this provision and
the agreement as a whole.47 Likewise, Article 3.3 allows members to maintain
a higher level of protection than that achieved under existing international
48standards, but requires "scientific justification" for the extra protection.
"Scientific justification" under the SPS Agreement is explained in Article 5,
which requires that challenged SPS measures be "based on an assessment...
of the risks to human, animal, or plant life or health. 49
The term "risk assessment," in turn, is defined in Annex A as:
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease
within the territory of an importing Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary
measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological and
41. European Union Lifts GM Food Ban, BBC NEws WORLD EDITION, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3727827.stm (May 19, 2004).
42. Steve Charnovitz, Improving the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, in
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM 171 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds.,
2000).
43. See SPS Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl. (stating that WTO members desire "to further the
use of harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary measures"); id. art. 3 (entitled "Harmonization').
44. Id. art. 3.3.
45. Id. pmbl.
46. Id. art. 2.2.
47. Id. art. 3.2.
48. Id. art. 3.3.
49. Id. art. 5.1.
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economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human
or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.
50
This risk assessment also must take into account "available scientific
evidence," as well as "relevant processes and production methods,
relevant ecological and environmental conditions," and other factors.
51
Under Article 5.7, member states may legitimately maintain provisional
SPS measures without meeting the usual requirements of risk assessment and
scientific justification, but only when "relevant scientific evidence is
insufficient" and other conditions are met.52 In the November 2003 Japanese
Apples decision,53 the WTO Appellate Body stated that "relevant scientific
evidence will be 'insufficient' within the meaning of. . . Article 5.7 if the
body of available scientific evidence does not allow, in quantitative or
qualitative terms, the performance of an adequate assessment of risks as
required under Article 5.1 and as defined in Annex A to the SPS
Agreement.
54
Judicial interpretation in the Biotech Products case will be critical not
only for settling the case at hand, but also for helping to resolve a fundamental
tension that lies at the core of the SPS Agreement and is inherent in the above-
cited provisions. Using science to enforce harmonization is a more ambitious
goal than using it to combat protectionism, but the SPS Agreement text is
ambiguous about how the goals of harmonization and nondiscrimination
should be balanced. Scholars have debated the proper and legitimate use of
science at the WTO since its inception. Applying rigid concepts of sound
science to scrutinize member states' regulatory decisions, especially in areas
of scientific uncertainty and contested politics, raises problems in terms of
cultural autonomy and democratic legitimacy. For this reason, David Wirth
has recommended that panels charged with hearing SPS disputes be "highly
deferential to the scientific determinations of national authorities," fearing that
otherwise panels will demand "excessively high correlation" between the
"scientific support and the regulatory measure chosen." 55 In a similar vein,
Vern R. Walker has argued that if SPS reviewers were not to exercise
deference, the WTO would come to stand for the "World Trans-Science
Organization.
56
Other commentators have even predicted that applying science-based
disciplines to international trade law ought to help create a permissive stance
toward individual state deviations from international food safety standards.
50. Id. annex A, para. 4.
51. Id. art. 5.2.
52. Id. art. 5.7.
53. Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003)
[hereinafter Japanese Apples, AB].
54. Id. para. 179 (emphasis added).
55. David Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines,
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 817, 857-59 (1994).
56. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 6. Alvin Weinberg has defined "trans-science" questions as
theoretical questions of fact that can be asked of, but not answered by, science. "Scientists have no
monopoly on wisdom where this kind of trans-science is involved; they shall have to accommodate the
will of the public and its representatives." Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA
209, 222 (1972).
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For instance, Jeffery Atik suggested that "the science-based disciplines create
new premises for the maintenance of national prerogatives in the face of
globalizing regulatory power," reasoning that these disciplines "permit
countries to freely make risk assessment, setting standards as high or low as
they see fit." 57 He based this conclusion on the fact that contemporary
scholars have generally repudiated of the possibility of value-free science.
Thus, in his view, science "promises little hope as a source for neutral
principles to resolve economic disputes among nations.
58
Nevertheless, Atik worried that the advent of the SPS Agreement would
instigate a "new kind of international discourse" whereby "the validation of
certain 'scientific voices' [would] further exacerbate the democracy problem
affecting trade pacts generally, and [would] affect internal allocations of
power and influence." s Indeed, the outcomes of four disputes under the SPS
Agreement seem to bear out this Prediction. In all four cases-which
concerned hormone-treated meats, GM salmon, 1 GM agricultural
products,62 and GM apples 63-WTO adjudicators have struck down national
regulatory measures for failing to meet SPS Agreement requirements.
Scholarly reaction to these decisions has been split. Some have seen
judicial review of science-based disciplines as a stable yet flexible
institutional solution to science policy disputes. Steve Charnovitz has
applauded the WTO's "science-based analysis" under the SPS Agreement,
and he laments the lack of similar standards in other WTO agreements.
64
Responding to the notion that the use of science under the SPS Agreement is
anti-democratic, Robert Howse has recently claimed that the "SPS [science-
based] provisions and their interpretation by the WTO dispute settlement
organs . . . can be, and should be, understood not as usurping legitimate
democratic choices for stricter regulations, but as enhancing the quality of
rational democratic deliberation about risk and its control.,
65
Other scholars argue that sound science standards implement a
conception of trade liberalization that moves too far beyond nondiscrimination
in trade toward excessive laissez-faire. 66 These critics perceive the use of
science in these SPS decisions as "a serious threat to the democratic system of
government of the WTO member states in the areas of health and
57. Jeffery Atik, Science and International Regulatory Convergence, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 736, 758 (1996-1997).
58. Id. at 758.
59. Id. at 758.
60. European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS/48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Hormones, AB).
61. Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998)
[hereinafter Salmon, ABI.
62. Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999)
[hereinafter Japanese Varietals, AB].
63. Japanese Apples, AB, supra note 53.
64. Steve Charnovitz, Improving the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards, in
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM 171, 185 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers
eds., 1999). Chamovitz points, for example, to the absence of any scientific basis for the WTO's
requirement that governments issue patents for at least twenty years, or its broad anti-dumping
provisions. Id. at 185-86.
65. Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade, supra note 13, at 2330.
66. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, supra note 12, at 293-312.
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environmental protection., 67 In this view, the WTO has measured different
risk-management decisions against a rigid standard of scientific evidence that
becomes a sort of procrustean bed: any measures that are unscientifically
stringent will be chopped to meet the standard size. (Of course, the analogy is
not perfect, as unscientifically low risk assessments are favored in a regime of
trade liberalization.) Thus, the SPS Agreement's critics see the accord not
only as usurping legitimate, culturally specific decision-making, but as
evincing an anti-regulation bias in the areas of food and environmental safety.
In Biotech Products, the U.S. case against the EU rests to a significant
degree on the idea that reversals of regulatory policy regarding GMOs within
the EU and its member states illustrate their departure from a fixed body of
sound science and constitute "undue delays" under the SPS Agreement. In
its submission to the panel, the United States adduced that there were eighteen
biotech products with notifications pending under EU Directive 2001/18, all
of which had first been submitted under EU Directive 90/220/EEC and had
then failed to advance through the approval process. 69 Nine of these products
still languished at the European Commission level despite having received
favorable initial assessments, the submission points out, and positive opinions
from the Scientific Committee for Plants.7 °
The Biotech Products case, therefore, represents a crucial moment in
trade law and international science policymaking. It may shape not only the
trajectory of new agricultural biotechnologies, but also the extent to which the
WTO can and should invoke particular conceptions of sound science to
legitimate trade products. Specifically, the decision rendered by the dispute
settlement panel, and perhaps a subsequent decision by the Appellate Body,
will help construct international norms around what sorts of scientific or
cultural evidence will justify a precautionary approach to food regulation.
More generally, the WTO adjudicatory body will redefine the balance
between state and global power in legal, political, and epistemic terms.
III. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE: LESSONS ON SCIENTIFIC
RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE GMO CONTEXT
In this Part we explore why it may be wrong to think that science alone
can decide questions of adequacy in risk assessment. We present existing
social science research on risk assessment in order to demonstrate that it is
neither a science nor a single methodology based on sound science. Rather,
risk assessment always incorporates policy and value judgments, and it is far
from a one-size-fits-all scientific endeavor. Furthermore, public participation
has an important role to play in generating reliable and conclusive risk
assessments, especially in novel and contested risk situations.
67. See, e.g., Theofanis Christoforou, Settlement of Science-Based Trade Disputes in the
WTO: A Critical Review of the Developing Case Law in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 8 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 622, 622-23 (2000) [hereinafter Christoforou, Settlement of Science-Based Trade Disputes
in the WTO]; see also supra note 2.
68. See First U.S. Submission, supra note 5, at 17, 35, 50.
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id. at 17.
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A. Risk Assessment Is Contingent on Values and Policy Judgments
State-of-the-art social science scholarship and recent international
regulatory work have emphasized the fact that science and values interact
dynamically in the process of risk analysis, even at early stages when risks are
first being assessed. As an initial example, it is now widely acknowledged in
the policy literature that risk identification (the starting point of all formal risk
analysis)71 is not simply a matter of recognizing a problem, but involves a
process of selection and characterization known as "framing. ' '72 Frames are
"principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit
theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters." 73 A
policymaker's perceptions and judgments are a function both of empirical
observation and of the conceptual lenses used to view the evidence.
Framing, it can be seen, is integrally related to the possibility of control.
Problems that have been framed with particular causal explanations can also,
in principle, be controlled by addressing the perceived causes. At the same
time, framing is by its nature also an instrument of exclusion. As some parts
of an issue come within a problem frame, other parts are left out as irrelevant,
incomprehensible, or uncontrollable.
One way in which framing assumptions and values shape risk
assessment is by dictating how different types and sources of scientific
uncertainty will be integrated into the risk-identification and risk-evaluation
process. A significant amount of scientific uncertainty underlies most risk
assessments, and decision-makers must somehow narrow the inevitable
knowledge gaps in order to assign risk values to particular objects of study.75
For example, limiting the probabilistic measure for risk assessment to human
mortality tacitly places zero value on protecting non-humans; it also places
little value on protecting humans from non-fatal forms of harm. Even the
tradeoff between mortality and morbidity (for example, pain associated with
illness) involves tacit value judgments. There is no guarantee that such
technical practices and relative weighting reflect wider societal values and
priorities-or even defensible approximations thereof.
71. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983).
72. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1996) [hereinafter NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK]; MARTIN
REIN & DONALD A. SCHON, FRAME/REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY
CONTROVERSIES (1994); Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing
Science, 41 MINERVA 223, 240-41 (2003) (arguing that flame analysis is a critically important tool of
policymaking); Brian Wynne, Frameworks of Rationality in Risk Management: Towards the Testing of
Naive Sociology, in ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS: PERCEPTION, ANALYSIS, AND MANAGEMENT 33, 33
(Jennifer Brown ed., 1989).
73. TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING: MASS MEDIA IN THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF THE NEW LEFT 6 (1980).
74. See generally GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS 1-9 (1971).
75. See Vern R. Walker, The Myth of Science as a "Neutral Arbiter" for Triggering
Precautions, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMI. L. REv. 197, 205 (2003).
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Vern R. Walker has identified different types of scientific uncertainty
with which risk assessors must cope.76 Conceptual uncertainty refers to the
latitude scientists have in selecting relevant variables, categories, and
hypotheses, all of which are shaped by the particular conceptual frame and
causal theory employed. 77 Other sources of uncertainty include samplin
decisions, the selection of models, and the existence of complex causation.
Risk assessors cope with and integrate these sources of uncertainty into their
analyses through workin9 assumptions and policy judgments-which are, by
definition, non-scientific.
This conception of the dynamic interplay between science and values in
risk assessment has recently been taken up in international regulatory
discourse. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), for
example, convened an expert panel to examine the proper role of ethics in
food risk assessment. In 2002, the panel concluded that risk assessors' choices
of data and methods may differ according to the particular values emphasized,
leading to divergent estimates of risk.80 For example:
(1) Hazard identifications can be based on mortality or morbidity, economic
consequence, or other perceived values;
8 1
(2) A choice may be made regarding whether hazards are based on "best practice" or
"typical use";
8 2
(3) Different extrapolation models may be required when moving from animal to human
toxicity studies, 8 when shifting from micro-ecosystems to farm-scale agricultural
environments, or when extending dose-response curves;8
4
(4) Populations from which exposure estimates are drawn may be selected in different
ways;8 and
(5) The level and type of precaution appropriate to a given situation may vary.
8 6
As this FAO report makes clear, choices regarding risk identification,
methodological design, sampling, and extrapolation assumptions can involve
76. Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs of Science: Toward a Taxonomy of Scientific
Uncertainty for Decisionmakers, 23 CONN. L. REV. 567, 574-624 (1991).
77. See Walker, supra note 75, at 205 ("For example, the proposition 'inhaling air containing
high concentrations of benzene can cause leukaemia in people' asserts a causal relationship between
certain inhalation events and the development of leukaemia [sic] .... [and] does not refer to other
potentially causal factors-for example, genetic, developmental, or environmental factors.").
78. See id. at 208-11.
79. See, e.g., CONRAD BRUNK ET AL., VALUE ASSUMPTIONS IN RISK ASSESSMENT (1991);
Karsten Klint Jensen & Peter Sandoe, Food Safety and Ethics: The Interplay Between Science and
Values, 15 J. AGRIc. & ENVTL. ETHics 245 (2002).
80. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), FAO Expert
Consultation on Food Safety: Science and Ethics (September 2002), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/-
j0776e00.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2004) [hereinafter FAO Expert Consulation].
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 18.
83. See, e.g., L. S. Gold et al., Extrapolation of Carcinogenicity Between Species: Qualitative
and Quantitative Factors, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 579 (1992).
84. FAO Expert Consultation, supra note 80, at 18.
85. Id. at 18.
86. Id. at 18, 21.
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substantial policy decisions that must be made prior to, and throughout, the
risk-assessment process.
The Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), 87 to which the SPS
Agreement grants special authority in setting international food safety
standards,88 has itself emphasized the crucial interplay of science and values
throughout the risk-analysis process. In July 2003, the Codex adopted
principles stating that risk managers must set normative priorities to dictate
the thresholds, methodologies, and working assumptions used in conducting
risk assessments. By describing risk analysis as "an iterative process" in
which "interaction between risk managers and risk assessors is essential for
,,89practical application, the new "working principles for risk analysis" under
the Codex recognize the value-laden nature of risk assessment itself. As one
commentator has put it, "both science and policy could be better served by
recognizing the scientific limits of risk-assessment methods and allowing
scientific and policy judgment to interact to resolve unavoidable uncertainties
in the decision-making process."90
It is important to point out that the WTO has already articulated a
sympathetic view toward value-infused scientific policymaking. In Hormones,
the Appellate Body refused to recognize a legal demarcation between risk
assessment (which is based on quantitative analysis of risks) and risk
management (which involves judgments of value) in the determination ofm 1 km •91
optimal risk-management strategies. This approach should be supported in
the actual practice of risk analysis. It is neither feasible nor appropriate to
separate science policymaking into a purely technical phase and a political
phase.
B. Risk Assessment Depends on Political, Social, and Regulatory Contexts
A significant body of social science comparing the treatment of risk-
based decision-making across national political systems demonstrates how
differences in issue framing and science policy can lead to systematic
transnational variations in the assessment of health, safety, and environmental
87. According to the Codex website,
[T]he Commission was created in 1963 by FAO and WHO [the United Nations World
Health Organization] to develop food standards, guidelines and related texts such as
codes of practice under the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme. The main
purposes of this Programme are protecting health of the consumers and ensuring fair
trade practices in the food trade, and promoting coordination of all food standards work
undertaken by international governmental and non-governmental organizations.
http://www.codexalimentarius.net.
88. The Codex's food safety standards and guidelines provide a saife harbor for food
regulations challenged under the SPS Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl. & arts. 3.1, 3.4. The WTO
Appellate Body has interpreted the language "based on" in Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement ("Members
shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to
the circumstances, of the risks . . . .") to require the showing of a rational relationship between the
Codex standard and the measure adopted by the member state. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5.1.
89. Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session (Rome, June 30-
July 7, 2003), at 127, available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/session_26.jsp.
90. Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risk Assessment and Risk Management: An Uneasy Divorce, in
ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 99 (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle
D. Hollander eds., 1991).
91. Hormones, AB, supra note 60, para. 181. See also Howse, supra note 13, at 2343.
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risks. 92 This literature establishes that risks are defined, and hence can be
meaningfully interpreted and evaluated, only within particular political and
cultural contexts. These contexts influence both the initial identification of
hazard and subsequent attempts to assess the magnitude, seriousness, and
distribution of potential harms. Judgments about the same hazard, based on
the same scientific knowledge and evidence, do not always lead to the same
estimates of possible harm in different national regulatory systems. As
regulatory experience with nuclear power demonstrates, informed citizens in
one democratic society may discern unacceptable risks in a technology
assessed to be safe by their equally informed counterparts in another
democratic society. 93 Nor do regulatory authorities in different national
contexts necessarily agree on answers to the threshold question of whether a
hazard even exists in a given case. 94 In short, regulatory systems are
characterized by particular "cultures of rationality.
'" 95
Furthermore, different social systems might themselves tolerate different
structures and sources of risk. Risks are always created and distributed in
social systems, including by the organizations and institutions that are
supposed to control the risky activity. As a consequence, the magnitude of
the physical risk is, inter alia, a direct function of the qualities and
characteristics of the social relations and processes within those systems.
This canonical finding from the social sciences has been borne out in
recent cases. For instance, the official report on the Columbia space shuttle
accident recognized the important role that NASA's history and
organizational culture played in its management of the expedition. Indeed, the
sources of risk within the organizational structure of the space program were
emphasized as the investigation proceeded. 97 The Chernobyl disaster likewise
demonstrated that the risks associated with nuclear power could no longer be
evaluated outside the political and organizational structures in which they
operated: even though the machinery of the nuclear reactor operated exactly
as expected, unexpected human behavior led to a meltdown of the system.'
92. See, e.g., DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1986); Sheila Jasanoff, Technological Risk and Cultures of
Rationality, in NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INCORPORATING SCIENCE, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIOLOGY IN
DEVELOPING SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY STANDARDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 65 (2000);
Michael Power & Lynn S. McCarty, A Comparative Analysis of Environmental Risk Assessment/Risk
Management Frameworks, 32 ENvTL. SCI. & TECH. 224A, 231A (1998).
93. See generally ANGELA LIBERATORE, THE MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY: LEARNING
FROM CHERNOBYL (1999); DOROTHY NELKIN & MICHAEL POLLACK, THE ATOM BESIEGED:
EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY DISSENT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 107-18 (1981).
94. See, e.g., R. BRICKMAN ET AL., CONTROLLING CHEMICALS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1985).
95. Jasanoff, supra note 92.
96. See, e.g., U. BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (1992); C. PERROW,
NORMAL ACCIDENTS (1984); SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds.,
1992).
97. Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Final Report Vol. 1, at 9 (2003), available at
http://caib.us/news/report/volumel/default.htm ("[T]he Board broadened its mandate at the outset to
include an investigation of a wide range of historical and organizational issues [and its] conviction
regarding the importance of these factors strengthened as the investigation progressed, with the result
that this report, in its findings, conclusions, and recommendations, places as much weight on these
causal factors as on the more easily understood and corrected physical cause of the accident.").
98. LIBERATORE, supra note 93, at 225-47.
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Finally, the European beef scare involving Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) further illustrates how physical risk should not be
viewed in isolation. In the BSE case, those giving scientific advice to the
British government about the BSE risks in British beef from 1989 to 1995
were assuming that all the relevant regulations would be, and were being,
fully enforced. Because the official narratives were so reassuring, however,
compliance and enforcement were often incomplete. When the committee
advising the government eventually learned of the scale of the enforcement
deficit, it revised its assessment of the risks.
99
The WTO Appellate Body seems to recognize that risk is contingent on
particular social contexts. In Hormones, it stated that decision-makers should
be concerned about "not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory
operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies
as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse effects
on human health in the real world where people live and work and die."100
This ruling effectively encourages WTO member states to consider how risk
arises within patterns of human behavior and social practice.
For the purposes of understanding the regulatory conflict at the heart of
Biotech Products, it is particularly important to consider other areas in which
the United States and Europe have diverged in their regulatory cultures.
Throughout recent regulatory history, U.S. and European risk regulation has
diverged at the initial stage of hazard identification, with different hazards
commanding different levels of public concern and attention across national
borders. Cancer, for example, has been more of a concern in the United States
than in Europe, while risks to forests and countryside have attracted more
attention in some European countries. 101 Approaches to assessing similar
hazards have also diverged. U.S. agencies on the whole have made greater use
than their European counterparts of formal and quantitative methodologies in
assessing risks, costs, and benefits for purposes of regulation. Even in
instances where U.S. and EU scientists have agreed on the nature of the
hazard, they have not always agreed on how the hazard should be managed. In
food regulation, for example, many EU nations permit the sale of fresh
cheeses made from unpasteurized milk, which are banned from the United
States.102 Finally, a major, long-entrenched trade dispute between the United
States and the EU over hormone-treated beef continues to this day. Simple
99. See Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers et al., The BSE Inquiry: The Report, Findings &
Conclusions (2000), available at http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/report/volumel/execsumS.htm
[hereinafter BSE Inquiry Report]. This inquiry was announced in the British Parliament on December
22, 1997, and set up on January 12, 1998, to establish and review the history of the emergence and
identification of BSE and the new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) in the United Kingdom, and
the action taken in response to them up to March 20, 1996.
100. Hornones, AB, supra note 60, para. 187 (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., BRICKMAN, supra note 94. A four-country comparison of U.S. and European
chemical regulation in the mid-1980s showed that European nations neither worried about carcinogens
to the same extent as the United States nor developed comparable programs of testing and risk
assessment. Id. at 37-48, 203. Note also that despite overall similarities, significant differences exist
between the United States and Canada even on seemingly uncontroversial issues such as the proper daily
intake of Vitamin C. See JOSEPH. H. HULSE, SCIENCE, AGRICULTURE, AND FOOD SECURITY 62 (1995).
102. See, e.g., Lawrence Busch, T6merit6 Amiricaine et Prudence Europoenne?, 339 LA
RECHERCHE 19 (2001).
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protectionist explanations for such divergences ignore the "long-standing and
broader differences in regulatory cultures and food safety laws on either side
of the Atlantic."'
0 3
These systematic variations demonstrate that risk assessment includes
not only an objective, science-based analysis of technical evidence but also
political understandings about appropriate forms and means of governance,
that are conventionally seen as falling within the domain of risk management.
Indeed, the very decision to develop or elaborate risk-assessment methods
depends on a prior political judgment that a risk worth assessing exists. Thus,
chemical risk-assessment procedures developed earlier and went further in the
United States than in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.104 By contrast, with
respect to GM crops and foods, EU member states have arguably taken the
lead in evaluating the ecological impacts of commercial GM crop production.
C. Public Participation Helps Generate Reliable Risk Assessment
Most experts in science policy have recognized the importance of
bringing public deliberation into the process of risk assessment. They
acknowledge that such public participation is often crucial for achieving both
scientifically and politically reliable results. Scientific risk assessment
necessarily involves the prior selection of the objects of analytic attention,
reflecting what is collectively valued and thus worthy of possible protection.
There is no guarantee that such technical practices of relative weighting
reflect wider societal values and priorities, or even defensible approximations
of those values, without adequate public consultation.
Indeed, an inclusive procedural approach to risk assessment-as
distinguished from the hitherto conventional, objective evaluation of risk
probabilities by technical experts-has been proposed and in some cases
implemented in regulatory settings within the United States and elsewhere.
The U.S. National Research Council (NRC) has been called on to consider
how to improve risk analysis for national public health, safety, and
environmental regulation. 105 In response, the NRC's Understanding Risk:
Informing Decision in a Democratic Society concluded that the success of the
risk-assessment process depends on:
deliberations that formulate the decision problem, guide analysis to improve decision
participants' understanding, seek the meaning of analytic findings and uncertainties, and
improve the ability of interested and affected parties to participate effectively in the risk
decision process; and... an appropriately diverse participation or representation of the
spectrum of interested and affected parties, of decision makers, and of specialists in risk
analysis, at each step.
106
In making the important role of public deliberation and consultation explicit,
this report built upon other canonical works by the NRC, one of which
concluded that "the first and probably most important step in effective risk
103. Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 17, at 42. See generally Jasanoff, supra note 20.
104. See BRICKMAN, supra note 89.
105. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 72, at ix.
106. Id. at 3.
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assessment and risk management is to establish public participation that
involves all the stakeholders."'
10 7
1. Public Contributions to GMO Risk Assessment in Europe
Regulatory experience with GMOs has established sound scientific
reasons for including the public in the assessment of the risk of novel
technologies: public deliberation can help establish priorities, define exactl
what is at stake, and suggest crucial avenues of further scientific learning.
As the recently released GM Science Review in the United Kingdom has
concluded, "the provision of robust scientific advice to policy making,
depends not only on the involvement of a wide range of specialist disciplines,
but also on in-depth critical engagement with public values and concerns."'
10 9
The years of the GMO "moratorium" in the EU created the opportunity
for informational triangulation involving publics, experts, and regulators
across EU member states. It ultimately provided important feedback about the
sources of risk in the GM context.
For example, the public's perceived need for larger and locally based
field trials on the ecological effects of GMOs led to the so-called Farm Scale
Evaluations (FSEs) in the United Kingdom. Begun in 1998 and only recently
completed, the FSEs have made a very important contribution to knowledge
about the ecological impacts of growing GM crops outside the greenhouse."
t 0
The FSEs involved four years of field trials carried out in 273 fields across
Britain, at a cost of £5.9 million and involving more than 100 scientists."i '
The trials' primary purpose was to investigate the ecological impacts of the
distinctive herbicide regimes associated with four herbicide-resistant GM
107. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUILDING CONSENSUS THROUGH RISK ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION PROGRAM 26 (1994).
Along these lines, this report also states that "risk assessments concerning possible future outcomes at
DOE [the U.S. Department of Energy] weapons-complex sites ... must involve the public (in its many
guises) in the whole process, including the planning of the process and the definition of the scope of risk
assessment." Id. at 3. See also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK
ASSESSMENT 267 (1994) (stating that in assessing the risk of hazardous air pollutants, the Environmental
Protection Agency "should provide a process for public review and comment with a requirement that it
respond, so that outside parties can be assured that the methods used in risk assessments are
scientifically justifiable").
108. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS:
THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REGULATION (2002); GM Science Review Panel, GM Science Review,
Second Edition: An Open Review of the Science Relevant to GM Crops and Food Based on Interests and
Concerns of the Public § 1 (2004), http://www.gmsciencedebate.org.uk/report/default.htm#second (last
visited Dec. 12, 2004); Life-Sciences and biotechnology-A Strategy for Europe, Commission
Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the
Committee of the Regions, COM(02)27 final at 4, available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/com/cnc/-
2002/com2002_0027en01 .pdf.
109. GM Science Review Panel, supra note 108, at 12.
110. See, e.g., L.G. Firbank et al., An Introduction to the Farm-Scale Evaluations of
Genetically Modified Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, 40 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 2-16 (2003); see also Bayer
CropScience, Farm Scale Evaluations of GM Crops. Answers to Some Frequently Asked Questions, at
http:/www.bcsbioscience.co.uk/pdfs/FAQs%20on%20the%2OFSEs%20-*200ctober%203.pdf (last
visited Dec. 12, 2004).
111. U.K. DEP'T FOR ENv'T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, GM CROPS: EFFECTS ON FARMLAND
WILDLIFE (2003), http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/gm/fse.
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crops-beet, maize, and spring and winter oil-seed rape. On receiving the
results, U.K. Environment Secretary Margaret Beckett stated:
The Government commissioned this research-the biggest GM crop trials anywhere in
the world-to address a specific gap in our knowledge. The trials demonstrate the
precautionary approach which the Government has taken on GM crops from the start.
The results will be considered as part of the comprehensive risk assessment undertaken
for every GM crop.
112
Findings from these recent FSE studies extend the GM-related science
base significantly.113 For spring rape and beet, a substantial decrease in weed
and insect biodiversity was found (compared with equivalent conventional
crop-management regimes) with run-on indirect food chain implications for
insects including butterflies and bees, birds, and other creatures. 114 One
follow-up study established the inevitability of major cross-pollination
between GM and wild rape in the English countryside, in the event of no steps
being taken to block hybridization genetically.'
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Beyond providing feedback about particular crops, the FSE trials
ultimately led to the creation of the Agriculture and Environment
Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) in 2000, 116 with responsibility for
advising the British government on strategic issues at the intersection of
public values and scientific knowledge. The trials also helped spur a formal
three-pronged process of public dialogue in 2003. This process involved a
national public debate, a systematic review of the state of GM science," 7 and
112. U.K. DEP'T FOR ENV'T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, FARM SCALE EVALUATION
RESULTS-IMPORTANT NEW EVIDENCE ON GM CROPS (2003), http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/-
2003/031016a.htm.
113. For the full results of the farm-scale evaluations, see 358 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
SOC'Y: BIOLOGICAL SC. (2003), available at http://www.pubs.royalsoc.ac.uk/philbio/news/-
fse toc.htnl.
114. See D.R. Brooks et al., Invertebrate Responses to the Management of Genetically
Modified Herbicide-Tolerant and Conventional Spring Crops. I. Soil-Surface-Active Invertebrates, 358
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1847 (2003); A.J. Haughton et al., Invertebrate
Responses to the Management of Genetically Modified Herbicide Tolerant and Conventional Spring
Crops. I. Within-Field Epigeal and Aerial Arthropods, 358 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1863 (2003); D.B. Roy et al., Invertebrates and Vegetation of Field Margins Adjacent
to Crops Subject to Contrasting Herbicide Regimes in the Farm Scale Evaluations of Genetically
Modified Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, 358 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SoC'Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1879
(2003).
115. M.J. Wilkinson et. al, Hybridization Between Brassica Napus and Brassica Rapa on a
National Scale in the United Kingdom, 302 SCIENCE 401,401-03 (Oct. 17, 2003).
116. See Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission, http://www.aebc.gov.uk.
117. GM Science Review underscores the importance of public review in securing robust and
legitimate assessment of uncertainties. Over time, expert identification of areas of scientific uncertainty
and concern converged with expressed public concern over such matters as unknown environmental and
health consequences. See GM Science Review, supra note 108; see also Ambuj Sagar et al., The Tragedy
of the Commoners: Biotechnology and Its Publics, 18 NATURE BIOTECH. 2, 4 (2000) (arguing that
governing institutions and regulators "stand to gain greater acceptance only by soliciting public input,
implementing policies in a transparent and democratically representative fashion, and demonstrating
their responsiveness to concerns raised by scientific experts, other organizations, and citizens and
consumers around the world"). Processes such as these have enriched understanding of both the
scientific and the societal dimensions of GM crop developments. See Agriculture and Environment
Biotechnology Commission (AEBC), GM Crops?: Coexistence and Liability (2003),
http://www.aebc.gov.uk/aebc/reports/coexistence-liability.shtml. They have also informed AEBC's
recommendations for new statutory guidelines aimed at guaranteeing acceptable levels of coexistence of
GM and non-GM crops and appropriate liability regimes. See id.
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an assessment of the potential national economic implications of possible GM
commercialization.
The FSE trials are one important example of the frequent mismatch
between official risk assessment and public attitudes with respect to the
framing of risk issues to be addressed. These trials also illustrate how public
participation can inform scientific risk assessment and provide procedural
improvements to general risk-assessment systems.
2. Lack of Public Participation in U.S. GMO Risk Assessment
In contrast to Europe, where time has been allocated for public inputs
that have helped frame GMO risk assessment in ways that respond to public
concerns and values, the United States has implemented a regulatory approach
without engaging with the public regarding the likely risks associated with
GM technologies. Instead, the Unites States has relied almost exclusively on
post-market oversight. 118 Indeed, even though the United States has been
doing field trials for some fifteen years, it has neither engaged in any post-
harvest testing of GM crops nor conducted any systematic testing of the
ingestion of foods produced through genetic modification. 
19
A more inclusive and rigorous risk-assessment process from the outset
may have spared the United States two of its own regulatory reversals,
concerning StarLink and Prodigene, which occurred during the very years of
the alleged EU moratorium. Both reversals resulted from human behaviors
that the initial risk assessments had failed to anticipate. As one legal
commentator has noted, industry failures and changes in the regulatory
approach to GMOs in the United States during this period produced a
credibility problem among U.S. consumers.12
0
The first case involved the maize hybrid called StarLink. StarLink
contained the Cry9c protein from Bacillus thuringiensis that was licensed to
the Aventis CropScience Corporation. Under U.S. law, StarLink was at once a
crop, a food, and a pesticide, requiring risk assessments by three separate
agencies: the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)."'
118. Michael R. Taylor & Jody S. Tick, Post-Market Oversight of Biotech Foods: Is the
System Prepared? (2003), at http://pewagbiotech.org/research/postmarket/ (raising questions
about how the U.S. regulatory system works and whether it is prepared for the challenges it will
face in the future). See also Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, About the Pew Initiative
on Food and Biotechnology, at http://pewagbiotech.org/about:
The Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology was established in 2001 to be an
independent and objective source of credible information on agricultural biotechnology
for the public, media and policymakers. Funded through a grant from The Pew Charitable
Trusts to the University of Richmond, the Initiative advocates neither for, nor against,
agricultural biotechnology. Instead, the Initiative is committed to providing information
and encouraging debate and dialogue so that consumers and policymakers can make their
own informed decisions.
119. There is no available evidence as to why this is the case.
120. Rebecca M. Bratspies, Bridging the Genetic Divide: Confidence-Building Measures for
Genetically-Modified Crops, 44 JuRImETRIcs J. 63, 74 (2003) (proposing measures aimed at building the
trust of consumers with regard to environmental concerns raised by GMOs).
121. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology; Establishment of the
Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174, 47,176 (Nov. 14, 1985)
(acknowledging that "new scientific issues arising frequently could be of concern to several [federal
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As a result of concerns raised about StarLink's potential allergenicity in
humans, a 1998 ad hoc committee with representatives from all three agencies
determined that a "split registration" would be granted: the maize was to be
used in animal feed but not in human food. 122
In September 2000, StarLink DNA was discovered in a number of
processed food products. 123 Aventis, the USDA, the EPA, grain elevator
operators, food processors, and grocers became involved in a massive and
costly recall. In light of these events, the EPA called two Scientific Advisory
Panel (SAP) meetings in November 2000 and July 2001 to discuss the
evidence concerning the impact of StarLink on human health. The panels
concluded that there was a medium probability that the Cry9c protein was an
allergen, and a low probability that it would cause an allergic reaction.
Nevertheless, the July SAP asserted that, while reducing the probability, the
evidence presented to the SAPs did not "eliminate StarLink Cry9c protein as a
potential cause of allergenic reactions." 124 The EPA ultimately rejected
Aventis' request for a tolerance exemption. As a result of this incident, the
U.S. government decided to no longer permit split registrations. This
represented a marked change in risk assessment of products that fall into two
or more categories, such as food and feed.
The Prodigene case that emerged in October 2002 marked the second
time that U.S. risk-assessment procedures were reviewed and revised after
further experience. In this instance, the Prodigene Corporation received
permission to engage in a field test of a GM maize plant containing an insulin
precursor, Trypsin. 125 The maize was planted in an unmarked field in rural
Iowa and was to be used to produce pharmaceutical products. Part of the
agreement with the USDA, which approved the field trials, was that the field
would be quarantined the following year so as to remove any "volunteer"
plants.
126
In fact, the fields were not adequately isolated and an undetermined
quantity of GM maize was harvested along with about 500,000 bushels of
regulatory] agencies," and authorizing the new Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee to
"receive information regarding the scientific aspects of biotechnology applications submitted to federal
research and regulatory agencies for approval," in order to "conduct analyses of broad scientific issues
that extend beyond those of any one agency and develop generic scientific recommendations that can be
applied to similar, recurring applications."); see also Envtl. Prot. Agency, Introduction to Biotechnology
for Pesticides, http://www.epa.gov/oppbppdl/biopesticides/regtools/biotech-reg-prod.htm# ("As part of
a coordinated federal framework for biotechnology, biotech crops undergo a food safety and
environmental approval process by the EPA,. .. FDA and the... USDA.").
122. See Alejandro E. Segarra & Jean M. Rawson, StarLink Corn Controversy: Background,
Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. RS20732 (Jan. 10, 2001), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/-
agriculture/ag- 101 .cfm.
123. William Lin et al., StarLink: Where No Cry9C Corn Should Have Gone Before, CHOICES,
Winter 2001-2002, at 31.
124. FIFRA Sct. ADVISORY PANEL, EPA, A SET OF SCIENTIFIC ISSUES BEING CONSIDERED BY
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REGARDING: ASSESSMENT OF ADDITIONAL SCIENTIFIC
INFORMATION CONCERNING STARLNKTM CORN 10 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/-
2000/november/one.pdf.
125. Bill Hord, The Road Back: Prodigene and Other Biotech Companies Are Moving Ahead
in an Environment of Increasing Fear of Crop Contamination, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Jan. 19, 2003,
at 1 (d).
126. When plants (usually from the previous season) that do not belong in the field emerge,
e.g., a corn stalk in a soybean field, they are called "volunteers."
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soybeans the following season. The USDA learned of the problem and had the
soybeans destroyed, thereby removing all potential for harm-but at a
considerable cost. In addition, the U.S. Grocery Manufacturers Association
and the National Food Processors Association raised their concerns that future
such incidents be avoided."' In light of this mishap, the USDA decided to
review its risk-assessment process, requiring that future trials be conducted
under far more controlled conditions. This case drives home the point that in
conducting assessment of the risks posed by new technologies, one cannot
ignore the organizational structure in which these technologies are managed
and overseen.
Finally, a case emerged in September 2004 that highlights how U.S.
regulators have begun to solicit public input in the consideration of particular
biotech products, and how this change has in turn generated both new
scientific studies and new regulatory approaches to risk assessment. After
hearing public comments in March 2004 concerning the release of a strain of
bentgrass that had been genetically modified to resist Roundup herbicide,
EPA scientists conducted a study of the gene flow from the grass pollen to
wild strains in surrounding areas. 128 The resulting study found that GM
bentgrass pollinated test plants of the same species growing at least as far as
thirteen miles downwind. 129 These findings exacerbated previously stated
concerns of the federal Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
that the grass could spread to areas where it is not wanted, or transfer its
herbicidal resistance to other plant species, creating superweeds immune to
weed killers. 130 This result has led to demands by the mainstream U.S. press to
conduct "a careful reassessment of how such plants are regulated" because of
the need to "ensure that the genes from genetically engineered plants do not
escape into the wild and wreak havoc in natural ecosystems." 31 As a result of
the public comments and this latest study, the USDA decided to produce a full
environmental impact assessment, which is estimated to take a year or
more. 132
D. Risk Situations Lie on a Certainty-Consensus Continuum
Risk situations themselves vary greatly. In order to capture this
diversity, we propose that risk situations should be reconceptualized as lying
on a continuum from low certainty and low consensus to high certainty and
high consensus. At one extreme, cases are characterized by high certainty
with respect to the knowledge base to be relied upon and the analytic methods
to be applied, as well as high consensus with respect to the framing of the
scientific issues to be addressed and the values to be protected through public
policy. Such a characterization is not unprecedented; it accords well with
127. Stephanie Simon, Fearing a Field of Genes, L.A. TnmEs, Dec. 23, 2002, at I.
128. Andrew Pollack, Genes From Engineered Grass Spread for Miles, Study Finds, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 21, 2004, at Al.
129. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Provides Methods for Studying Genetically Modified Pollen,
http://www.epa.gov/ord/htm/bentgrass.htm.
130. Pollack, supra note 128.
131. Editorial, The Travels of a Bioengineered Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at A28.
132. Pollack; supra note 128.
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previous suggested approaches to evaluating scientific uncertainty in science
policy decision-making. Environmental scholarship, for instance, has
discussed how uncertainty "may be thought of as a continuum ranging from
zero for certain information to intermediate levels for information with
statistical uncertainty and known probabilities (risk) to high levels for
information with true uncertainty or indeterminacy."'1 33 Our continuum builds
on this work, but it acknowledges consensus on values and methods as a
crucial component in any taxonomy of risk situations.
A good example of such a high certainty-high consensus area might be
the risks known to be associated with smoking cigarettes. In such situations,
the ratio of reliable and accepted science to science policy and value judgment
in any risk assessment will be fairly high. With regard to cigarettes, many
international epidemiological and toxicological studies have come to similar
conclusions about the potential of smoking to cause cancer and heart disease.
There are accepted ways of studying health effects in living people. As a
result, the body of scientific evidence itself may provide a more reliable basis
on which to judge the legitimacy of regulatory interventions.
Other risk situations, by contrast will be characterized by low certainty
and low consensus on such matters. In these situations, little epidemiological
evidence might be available, or there may be a limited number of animal
toxicological studies, necessitating choices concerning the proper
extrapolation values. There may be underlying disagreement about what the
potential harm consists of, or how the harm should be framed, and a more
limited array of scientific studies investigating different dimensions of the
problem.
Two important corollaries emerge from this framework. First, risk-based
knowledge tends to move through the certainty-consensus continuum over
time. For example, although the risks of smoking for the smoker have clearly
been in the high-certainty, high-consensus range for some time, health risks
due to second-hand smoke have only recently begun to be studied and
established. Likewise, over the course of twenty years, international scientific
consensus began to emerge concerning the anthropogenic effects on global
climate change and the associated risks of loading the atmosphere with
carbon. 134 Risk situations that are novel, such as those involved in the
introduction of new technologies, can therefore be expected to begin as low-
certainty, low-consensus risk situations but potentially migrate into higher
levels of agreement over time.
Second, in conditions of low certainty and low consensus about the
values and methodologies underlying risk assessment, public input assumes
even greater social and scientific importance. From the perspective of
democratic legitimacy, public input will be more important in these situations
133. Robert Constanza & Laura Comwell, The 4P Approach to Dealing with Scientific
Uncertainty, ENV'T, Nov. 1992, at 13-14; cf Silvio Funtowicz & Jerome R. Ravetz, Three Types of Risk
Assessment and the Emergence of Post-Normal Science, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK, supra note 96, at
251 (setting out a matrix of three types of "problem solving strategies" along axes of "Decision Stakes"
and "Systems Uncertainty").
134. CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 10-12 (J. T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2001 ].
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because greater political discretion is exerted. From the perspective of
utilitarian benefit, public input will help frame risk in ways that make
regulation more relevant and effective. From the perspective of science, public
input can help present the relevant questions that need to be answered before
risks are assumed.
IV. RE-ORIENTING THE SPS AGREEMENT: EMBEDDED LIBERALISM AND
RISK ASSESSMENT
The insights described above suggest that the science used in risk
assessment is not a body of knowledge fixed at a particular moment in time
through a universally valid expert calculus. Nor is it a body of knowledge
arising in isolation from political and cultural values and perfectly transferable
across regulatory systems. Rather, sound science in the regulatory sphere
needs to be understood as being shaped by the normative priorities,
institutional cultures, and collective experiences that influence the framing of
risk itself. The temptation will be to invoke a singular conception of sound
science in order to achieve harmonization. But, as we have illustrated in the
preceding discussion, risk analyses and the standards they support
"incorporate not only 'objective' assessments of technical evidence but also
collective, often tacit, cultural judgments about the appropriateness of
particular social roles, power relationships," public attitudes, and regulatory
styles. 135 Risk assessments and their integration into regulatory policies are
value-laden processes, though the values involved often remain implicit.
These reminders of the practical applications of science in risk analysis
highlight the problems faced by WTO dispute settlement panels when
determining the adequacy of risk assessment and sufficiency of the evidence
presented to justify a given scientific regulation. How can a panel usefully
evaluate whether the available science supports a given state's policy
judgment or precautionary environmental measure without interfering with
cultural self-determination, when experience shows that scientific uptake is an
important domain of culture and values? How can the goals of international
regulatory harmonization and reducing disguised restrictions on trade be
accomplished without trampling upon the value-laden choices of
democratically accountable WTO member states?
In an age of anxiety about democratic accountability in international
lawmaking, this question emerges with special force. Real problems of
political legitimacy will result if WTO panels impose a particular science
policy on members under the guise of merely demanding sound science. As
135. Sheila Jasanoff, Harmonization-The Politics of Reasoning Together, in THE POLITICS OF
CHEMICAL RISK 173, 173 (Roland Bal & Willem Halffman eds., 1998). Hazardous-waste risk analysis
and management is an important illustrative case here. Even within the EC in the 1980s, problems in
international standardization arose. The EC's institutional approach to scientific and technical risk
knowledge assumed that a purely technical negotiation of common scientific criteria could harmonize
member states' varying technical risk standards for the classification and treatment of hazardous wastes.
In fact, however, incommensurable technical criteria reflected particular institutional and cultural
realities, implying the need for more complex forms of negotiation and convergence among the waste-
trading EC member states. See Duncan Laurence & Brian Wynne, Transporting Waste in the European
Community: A Free Market?, ENv'T, July-Aug. 1989, at 12.
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numerous trade commentators have pointed out, the WTO already suffers
from a democratic deficit.' 36 This deficit is perhaps most widely discussed in
connection with the exclusion of ordinary citizens from the ministerial
negotiating process, but it also pertains to the judicial use of interpretive
discretion in ways that order and enforce the normative priorities of the
trading regime in non-trade domains such as health and the environment.'
37
The danger of such broad judicial reach is especially acute in low-certainty,
low-consensus situations, where public input and values are needed to frame
problems and thereby trigger the very scientific questions necessary to
produce adequate and credible risk assessments.
Thus, it is na've to try to use the SPS Agreement to move beyond
disciplining protectionism toward disciplining those national regulations that
might be deemed unnecessary by the lights of a singular and supposedly
universal "sound science." This move would be not only unrealistic with
respect to the realities of regulatory science, but also inconsistent with the
original goals of the international trading regime. It is important to remember
that the structure of the world trading system embodies the idea that free trade
cannot be pursued at the expense of other important social goals, and that
individual state approaches to social problems should be tolerated within a
system of "embedded liberalism."13 8 From the beginning, the GATT's goal of
trade liberalization was embedded within a political commitment to the
interventionist welfare state shared by the major trading nations of that era.
The major players had a progressive political and social vision for the trading
system that included mutual respect for the diverse avenues through which
nations chose to implement that shared vision.139 The same sort of embedded
approach is required when the new trading regime approaches risk-based
decision-making and the use of science. Furthermore, it is consistent with the
SPS Agreement's stated goals that harmonization be promoted "without
requiring Members to change their appropriate level of protection of human,
animal, or plant life or health.'
140
V. RETHINKING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SCIENCE UNDER THE SPS
AGREEMENT
The theoretical models of risk and risk assessment that we have just
outlined carry two significant implications for guiding judicial review of risk-
based decision-making at the WTO. First, when interpreting the SPS
Agreement, judges should steer away from adopting any member state's
conclusions as scientific truths; they should instead act more as an
administrative tribunal searching for transparency and procedural adequacy.
Although court-appointed scientific experts may aid the process, the scope of
analysis should include expert opinion about the interaction of values and
136. See supra note 2.
137. Id.
138. See John G. Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Regimes, in
CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION 62 (1998).
139. See, e.g., Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy--And Back Again:. The Fate of the
Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 94-101 (2002).
140. See SPS Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl., para. 6.
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science in the regulatory process. Such an administrative role for WTO
adjudicators would help preserve space for public participation at the member-
state level. Second, public participation should be considered as a valid and
crucial part of the risk-assessment process under the SPS Agreement,
particularly in situations of low-certainty, low-consensus technologies.
Recognizing public participation as a legitimate input to risk assessment
would help to foster a more robust understanding of the scientific and non-
scientific risks actually faced by member states and would help to build the
political legitimacy of the WTO itself.
From the perspective of promoting democratic self-determination with
regard to risk-based regulation, the advantages of implementing these two
ideas are clear enough. Yet how may these ideas be plausibly introduced into
the SPS Agreement, and in such a way that does not undermine its anti-
protectionist tools? We will answer these questions by focusing on standards
of review, the use of experts, and Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.
A. Standard of Review
As noted above, the WTO faces the dual goals of ferreting out
protectionism while protecting legitimate cultural differences that may impact
scientific decision-making. These two objectives can be reduced to one basic
principle of nondiscrimination: so long as member states are not treating
foreign products in a discriminatory manner, WTO judges can have some
assurance that the cultural differences are legitimate. Therefore, the review
conducted by WTO judges as they assess the facts and the law under the SPS
Agreement should be aimed at enforcing the transparent, accountable, and
reasoned use of science and risk assessment. Focusing on proper and
legitimate procedures for the integration of science and policy will allow the
WTO to assess whether discriminatory practices are, in fact, at play. Dispute
settlement panels should not function as adjudicatory bodies reviewing the
substantive scientific details underlying the parties' risk assessments. Rather,
a panel's appropriate role in evaluating the arguments of the parties is akin to
that of an administrative tribunal reviewing the adequacy of executive
decision-making processes. If adopted, this understanding of the proper
judicial role would facilitate an urgently needed international discourse on
rational decision-making in the regulatory sphere.
141
The judicial standard of review established by the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) and interpreted by previous Appellate Body
opinions supports this interpretation of the panel's review function. The
"objective assessment of the facts" set out by the DSU falls between total
deference and a de novo standard of review. 142 The Appellate Body in
141. A related conception of the panel's proper role has been argued by others. See Howse,
supra note 13, at 2330 ("SPS provisions and their interpretation by the WTO dispute settlement organs.
. . can be, and should be, understood not as usurping legitimate democratic choices for stricter
regulations, but as enhancing the quality of rational democratic deliberation about risk and its control").
142. DSU Article 11, "Function of Panels," states:
The function of panels is to assist the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] in discharging its
responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a
panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective
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Hormones made clear that panels should be concerned about their own
institutional competence in matters of science policy, stating that "[m]any
panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since
under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to
engage in such a review." 143 However, the opinion also stated that "total
deference to the findings of the national authorities ... could not ensure an
objective assessment as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU."144
The "objective assessment of the facts" standard ought to be applied to
the question of whether member states followed a legitimate process of risk
analysis, including whether their use of scientific evidence was plausible and
whether the member state actively sought or is seeking public input in the
areas where the scientific evidence is contested or insufficient. The crucial
question is how, exactly, WTO judges are to ascertain whether the facts have
been objectively assessed in the context of science-based decision-making. In
particular, how are legitimate expressions of political values differentiated
from illegitimate protectionism?
Here it is crucial that SPS legitimacy be effectuated by transparency.
Enforced transparency with respect to the regulatory uses of science will make
protectionist measures much harder to justify, but will do so without
interfering with national sovereignty. To this end, WTO panels should make
objective findings regarding member states' use of appropriate inputs into
policymaking. Were the required elements of risk assessment taken into
account? Was the available scientific evidence considered? Were public
deliberations conducted, and were the results factored in? Were decisions
clearly reasoned? Judges should also investigate whether members made a
record of considerations they viewed as germane in their risk assessments,
including their identification of the relevant technical issues and values at
stake. These questions should be familiar to administrative lawyers and jurists
alike, and will help in distinguishing protectionism from sanctionable science
policies with trade-distorting effects. This line of review would have the
further benefit of promoting public discourse about risk assessment at the
member state level, which, as noted above, is important to scientific and
political reliability.
It is important to be clear that we are not proposing that WTO panels
simply defer in their fact-finding to any member that cries the defense of
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the
relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in
making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered
agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them
adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 11, LEGAL
INSTRUMENT--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 33(1), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 112, 120 (1994),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dsue.htm. In Hormones, the Appellate Body
explicitly rejected de novo review of the scientific knowledge underpinning a decision, stating that
"activities [of the Panel] are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable
standard is neither de novo review as such, nor total deference, but rather the objective assessment of the
facts." Hormones, AB, supra note 60, para. 117.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing United States-Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre
Underwear, WT/DS24/R (Nov. 8, 1996), para. 7.10).
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science. Such complete deference would render the SPS Agreement
ineffective as a trade instrument, and might even "perversely encourage global
fragmentation in science by encouraging trade protectionist interests to co-opt
the academy." 145 The judicial posture proposed here preserves the
adjudicator's ability to ferret out protectionism without enforcing a
procrustean global science policy. In scrutinizing members' regulatory
decisions in light of the criteria suggested above, judges should be able to
distinguish legitimate forms of local regulatory sensibility from protectionism
by requiring reasoned decision-making that takes the presence, absence, and
substance of scientific evidence and expressed cultural values into account.
Our suggestion is that judges should adopt a role akin to the famous
"hard look" approach to science-based decision-making favored by Judge
Harold Leventhal on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1970s. At that
time, "[U.S. federal c]ourts demonstrated a willingness to probe the scientific
underpinnings of administrative actions and to demand reasoned explanations
for agency interpretations of controversial data." 146 Just how "hard" a look
should be given to agency decision-making in technical areas remained an
active topic of debate. 147 The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the hard look
approach in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,14 in which the Court
was asked to review a U.S. Department of Transportation decision to release
funds for the construction of a highway through a city park in Memphis,
Tennessee. The Court developed an approach to review that fell short of de
novo review, and yet still subjected agency decision-making to a "substantial
inquiry."'149 Such an inquiry, the Court said, demanded "a thorough, probing,
in-depth review" of agency decision-making, but one capable of ensuring that
"the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there [had been] a clear error of judgment."' 150 Finally, the Court made clear
that "although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the
ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency."' 151 A key point for the analysis
here is that U.S. courts inquire into not only the scientific evidence used by an
agency, but also into the public hearings and comments that were a relevant
factor in the agency's decision. If implemented in the WTO context, such a
hard look approach could generate a more vigorous ethos of accountability
that would minimize member states' strategic uses of scientific uncertainty for
protectionist gains. It would also recognize the important role of public
participation in establishing the platform of facts upon which agency decisions
must rest.
145. Walker, supra note 6, at 280.
146. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR 70 (1995).
147. Judges Bazelon and Leventhal on the D.C. Circuit, for example, became the spokesmen
for two different approaches to the problem of judicial review. Compare David L. Bazelon, Coping with
Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 817 (1977), with Harold Leventhal,
Environmental Decision-making and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
148. 401 U.S. 402, 415-17 (1971).
149. Id. at 415.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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In sum, we support an understanding of the judicial role in the SPS
context that is procedural in orientation and tends to be sensitive to localized
science policy decision-making. This posture is especially important in
regulatory areas that address risk situations characterized by low certainty and
low consensus. A number of trade scholars share this general conception of a
dispute settlement panel's proper role, 152 which stays within the DSU
language and its existing interpretations, and preserves the power to strike
down protectionist regulations.
B. The Role of Experts
The key to implementing any review model under the SPS Agreement
will be the appropriate selection and use of experts. The role of scientific
experts in advising courts and regulators use scientific experts was a major
issue in the technical decisions made during the 1970s in the United States,
53
and it remains a lively jurisprudential and policy debate today. 154 In prior
cases under the SPS Agreement, the panels sought advice from experts in
relevant sciences and risk-assessment fields to help guide their decisions.
155
The language of the text leaves to the discretion of the panel many procedural
and substantive questions about the choice of experts, the number of experts,
whether they will be consulted individually or as a group, and what their
precise role will be.
156
The selection and use of salient expert knowledge for the review of risk-
based regulation are more than routine matters. As discussed above,
established bodies of scientific expertise may assume particular selective
framings of the salient questions that may be incompatible with those of other,
equally qualified and relevant disciplinary subcultures. Disciplinary framings
152. See, e.g., Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the
Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 323 (2002); Howse, supra note 13, at 2357
(arguing that the science-based disciplines of the SPS Agreement "can be, and should be, understood not
as usurping legitimate democratic choices for stricter regulations, but as enhancing the quality of
rational democratic deliberation about risk and its control"); Walker, supra note 6, at 277-96; Wirth,
supra note 55, at 857-59.
153. See, e.g., JASANOFF, supra note 146, at 42-92.
154. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107
YALE L. J. 1535, 1681 (1998) (arguing that "intellectual due process" demands that "whether it is a
scientifically trained judge or juror or agency administrator, the same person who has legal authority
must also have epistemic competence in relevant scientific disciplines"); UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION'S MISUSE OF SCIENCE (Feb. 2004), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/documents/RSIfinal-fullreport.pdf; H.R. COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, MINORITY
STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIv., POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2003),
available at http://www.house.gov/reform/min/politicsandscience/pdfs/pdf politicsand science_rep.-
pdf.
155. Japanese Apples, supra note 53; Japanese Varietals, supra note 62; Hormones, AB, supra
note 60; Salmon, AB, supra note 61.
156. Article 11.2, which contains the only procedural information specific to the SPS
Agreement, states:
In a dispute under this Agreement involving scientific or technical issues, a panel should
seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to the
dispute. To this end, the panel may, when it deems it appropriate, establish an advisory
technical experts group, or consult the relevant international organizations, at the request
of either party to the dispute or on its own initiative.
SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 11.2.
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of relevance may also inappropriately exclude dimensions of relevant public
knowledge, as discussed above. As a result, the WTO should not limit its
experts to the natural sciences. Specialist, practice-based bodies of knowledge
such as, say, farming expertise, may be salient to risk assessment in ways that
are not covered by the expert knowledge of scientific disciplines. 157
Furthermore, the social sciences may offer insights to risk assessment,
especially concerning important social-behavioral variables. Robert Howse
has argued, for instance, that panels need "the expertise of those whose
research centers on the role of science within the process of regulation and
who move between the disciplines of science and regulatory theory."'
158
Scientists called upon in previous SPS cases were placed in a virtually
impossible position when they were asked to make purely scientific judgments
about the adequacy of risk assessment as a regulatory tool. 159
It is logical, therefore, that prior to the selection of experts there should
be a systematic review of the kinds of questions that are relevant to the case,
leading to the deliberate identification of bodies of specialist (or public)
knowledge and input necessary for a sound resolution of the issue. The
selection of experts might to some degree offset perceived deficiencies in the
national decision-making processes of the parties in the case. As discussed in
more detail below, part of expert analysis should focus on whether the risk
situation at hand is in an area of low, medium, or high certainty and
consensus. 16 Although we advocate that the scope of expert inquiries should
be broadened, this should not be taken to mean that the overall power of
expert analysis should be increased: WTO judges should be careful not to
attempt (through experts or otherwise) to become the high arbiters of
scientific truth in the world trading system. Such a view would directly
conflict with the Appellate Body's stated appreciation of legitimate scientific
differences and of its own zone of competence.
C. Article 5.7 and Public Participation
As discussed in Part III.D above, in conditions of low scientific certainty
and low consensus as to the values and methodologies underlying risk
assessment, public input assumes even greater social and scientific
importance. In these situations, decision-making should be all the more
accountable to and better informed by the public.
157. See, e.g., Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving Regulatory Strategy
for GMs-The Issue of Consistency with P/TO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 317,
348 (2000) ("[F]ollowing on the remarks of the Appellate Body in the Hormones case about the real
world in which people live and die, expertise concerning the effectiveness and consequences-social
and economic, or even cultural-of particular forms of risk management and regulatory intervention
may be appropriate.").
158. Howse, supra note 13, at 2346-47.
159. Id. This underscores the ambiguity of distinctions between science and values in framing
risk analyses. Scientists who are expert in particular technical domains do not necessarily have the
expertise needed to determine if a particular form of regulatory tool is adequate.
160. Existing SPS case law supports the use of experts as one input when considering the
sufficiency of both a prima facie challenge to an SPS measure and a defence of scientific justification.
For instance, the recent Japanese Apples report states correctly that panels are "entitled to take into
account the views of the experts." Japanese Apples. AB, supra note 53, para. 166.
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Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement provides a format for addressing
concerns about the need for public input. It offers a temporary safe harbor in
situations when the body of available scientific evidence does not allow, in
quantitative or qualitative terms, for the performance of an adequate
assessment of risks as required under Article 5.1 and as defined in Annex A to
the SPS Agreement, 161 so long as provisional measures are based on
"available pertinent information" and so long as the member seeking the
temporary safe harbor undertakes and completes its review of the technology
"within a reasonable period of time." 162
We suggest that classification of the risk situation on the continuum of
certainty and consensus should help dispute settlement panels establish the
availability and validity of this temporary safe harbor in situations where
members claim the need for more time for public participation in the risk-
assessment process.
1. "Insufficient" Scientific Evidence to Perform an "Adequate" Risk
Assessment
In Japanese Apples, the Appellate Body confirmed that insufficiency
should not exclude "cases where the available evidence is more than minimal
in quantity, but has not led to reliable or conclusive results. 1 63 Reliability and
conclusiveness are the key concepts here, and it becomes necessary to recall
our previous discussion on the use of science in risk assessment. If one lesson
emerges from the body of social science on risk, it is that reliability and
conclusiveness of the science involved in risk assessment are functions not
only of the scientific facts, but also of the value commitments of regulators
and the public. Therefore, science for risk assessment will only be reliable and
conclusive if it addresses their risk framings. To use an example relevant to
the GMO case, it is possible that the body of scientific evidence needed to
support a reliable and conclusive assessment of health risks would differ from
that needed to support a reliable and conclusive assessment of environmental
risks. Furthermore, sorting out the environmental risks to animal health, plant
health, and even insect health might each require different evidence and
assessments. In other words, reliability and conclusiveness are characteristics
not of the scientific evidence in isolation, but of the scientific evidence in
relation to the values of a particular community in a particular regulatory
context. Indeed, we have shown how evidence deemed reliable enough to
generate a sufficient risk assessment in one regulatory context may fail in
other contexts because of the different concerns, risk frames, and particular
circumstance.
Accordingly, it makes little sense to claim that existing scientific
evidence is sufficient for an adequate assessment of the risks if it fails to
address risks that a particular community actually cares about. Values shape
the very scientific questions that drive risk assessment. Therefore, we propose
that WTO members may take advantage of the temporary SPS Agreement
161. Id. para. 179.
162. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5.7.
163. Japanese Apples, AB, supra note 53, para. 185 (emphasis added).
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safe harbor in situations of low and medium certainty and consensus,
assuming that the members meet the other requirements of Article 5.7,
because the evidence in such situations would be by definition not reliable and
conclusive. In high-certainty, high-consensus risk situations, however,
assessments would be expected to converge and the safe harbor would be
presumptively unavailable.
2. Available "Pertinent Information"
Article 5.7 also requires that provisional measures be based on
"pertinent information." The term "pertinent information," like all treaty
language in the WTO agreements, should be interpreted in accordance with its
"ordinary meaning." 164 The Oxford English Dictionary defines "pertinent" as
"pertaining or relating to the matter in hand; relevant; to the point;
,%65 . 66apposite." Contextual language is also important for treaty interpretation.,
The first sentence of Article 5.7 clearly differentiates "pertinent information"
from "relevant scientific information," implying that the former is a broader
category than the latter. The term should be interpreted to include substantive
inputs from officially recognized public deliberations, experiential data not
available from the published scientific literature, and other information
concerning public values such as consumer data on public attitudes.
3. "Within a Reasonable Time" and Without "Undue Delay"
Finally, the SPS Agreement includes a number of provisions concerning
the time period for the implementation of SPS measures and their subsequent
reassessment. Under Article 5.7, in addition to the requirements already
mentioned, members must "review the . . . measure accordingly within a
reasonable period of time." 167 Furthermore, Annex C to Article 8 provides that
members must "ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure the
fulfillment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that.., such procedures are
undertaken and completed without undue delay."
' 168
The terms "reasonable" and "undue" are legal standards left to be
defined on a case-by-case basis, and WTO adjudicators would be ill-advised
to attempt to set an arbitrary time standard that would apply to all risk
assessments. Instead, we argue that questions about what constitutes a
reasonable time period for the completion of public participation or further
scientific study should be addressed at the national level, as member states
take into account the location of a risk issue on the certainty-consensus
164. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 321, 340 (1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] ("A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
165. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
166. Vienna Convention, supra note 164.
167. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5.7.
168. Id. art. 8, Annex C. We analyze this requirement along with the "reasonable time"
requirement of Article 5.7 because they both require the assessment of whether the amount of time at
issue is justified. In litigation, these provisions would be analyzed separately, but would require similar
consideration.
Adjudicating the GM Food Wars
continuum. A member that seeks an Article 5.7 safe harbor would be required
to put forth a concrete plan including the studies to be conducted and the
expected times for completion; any member opposing the safe harbor could
introduce evidence purporting to show that the timetable was unreasonable. A
dispute settlement panel would then enlist its own science and social science
experts to help in its determination of whether the claim of appropriateness is
justified.
4. Determining the Levels of Certainty and Consensus
Our proposal of tying the availability of the Article 5.7 safe harbor to the
risk situation's position on the continuum of certainty and consensus raises the
important issue of how judges should locate the risk at hand along that
continuum. Although the characterizations of certainty and consensus must be
carried out on a case-by-case basis and may require input from experts
appointed by the panel, general principles surface upon review of the social
science literature and experiences discussed above.
First, the amount of time that the technology and its underlying science
has had to mature and to interact in real-world settings will have significant
implications for where the technology falls on the certainty-consensus
spectrum. In the case of a relatively new technological use or risk assessment
in an uncertain environment, risk-assessment methodologies themselves may
not be standardized, 169 and there may not have been sufficient time for public
participation to flesh out the real-world enactments and impacts of the
technology and the consequential value judgments at stake.
A second important consideration in the certainty-consensus analysis is
whether or not the international standard-setting bodies mentioned in the SPS
Agreement have enacted standards or risk-assessment methods for the
particular risk situation. The SPS Agreement recognizes the Codex as an
authoritative source of food safety standards for the world trading system.
170
This means that the international body is a crucial indicator of the degree to
which the international food regulatory community has reached consensus on
both the risks of GMOs and the risk-assessment methodologies directed
toward them.
Panels should also consider the extent to which the record indicates
unresolved problems in the quantification of harms because of measurement
inadequacies, methodological issues, or unknowns in the conceptualization of
products and product effects. Relevant sources of evidence might include
articles from the scientific and social scientific press, reports emerging from
regulatory agencies within different member states, and also the outcome of
dialogues with segments of the public engaged in practices involving the risk
at issue. Such evidence could be used by either party to rebut the
169. Climate change, for example, began in this category of risk situations, and over time the
risk assessments in this area have become characterized by greater certainty and greater scientific
consensus. See CLIMATE CHANGE 2001, supra note 134, at 9-16, 471-524 (containing the contribution of
Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
which builds upon the previous five years of work to provide more detailed data and rigorous analysis).
170. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, pmbl., art. 3.2.
171. See generally Walker, supra note 76.
2005]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:81
presumptions established in the first test. Where evidence seems to be split,
testimony could be taken from experts in relevant fields to determine the
structure and weight of scientific and social opinion.
Finally, dispute settlement panels should consider evidence of whether
there is consensus and certainty as to the nature, sources, and extent of risk
involved in the particular situation. For instance, is there broad agreement as
to whether a risk should be framed as an environmental issue, a human health
issue, or both? What is deemed to be at risk in environmental and health
terms? Here, as above, relevant sources of evidence might include articles
from the scientific and social scientific press, reports emerging from
regulatory agencies, and also the outcome of public dialogues. Documentation
of public inputs into regulatory decision-making, results of national polls and
referenda, and consumer attitude and behavior data could also bear on this
issue.
D. During and After the Article 5.7 Safe Harbor
In situations where the WTO grants a temporary safe harbor under
Article 5.7, it should maintain jurisdiction over the case pending the
termination of the temporary safe harbor in order to limit its opportunistic
abuse. Periodically, the dispute settlement panel or appointed experts would
assess whether indeed the member was "seek[ing] to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk" 172 as the
Article requires. In these cases, not only further scientific studies but also
public hearings and comment periods would help satisfy this requirement. In
such cases, this mechanism would provide a forum to the opposing member to
bring concerns directly back to the panel without the need for requesting the
formation of a new panel.
When the time allocated for the safe harbor is complete, the case would
return for review under the main provisions of the SPS Agreement, and the
new information obtained from public participation or other relevant
processes would be a part of the risk assessment that the panel would review
under the standards articulated in Part V.A. Specifically, the information
obtained during the safe harbor period should be considered part of the
member's risk assessment under Article 5.1, so long as its influence on the
decision has been adequately documented in the record.1
7 3
172. SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5.7.
173. Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement requires that members ensure that SPS measures "are
based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life
or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations." SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 5.1. (emphasis added). The term "appropriate to the
circumstances" emphasizes that the relationship between a risk assessment and the SPS measure must be
analyzed with close attention to the facts of the particular case. The Appellate Body has emphasized that
the presence or absence of that relationship can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. See
Hormones, AB, supra note 60, para. 194. Judicial determination of the certainty and consensus levels in
a specific risk situation should also inform a measure's compliance with Article 5.1. Why is this
important? In risk situations characterized by low certainty and low consensus, public input and
deliberation should be recognized as legitimate and even desirable components of the risk-assessment
process under the SPS Agreement. Indeed, WTO case law makes it clear that SPS risk assessment can
involve qualitative factors that incorporate the values identified and the frames employed in the public
deliberations within member states. It may be the case that an adequate risk assessment in these
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When a case leaves the temporary safe harbor of Article 5.7, or when a
given SPS measure comes under first-time review, the levels of certainty and
consensus should also be relevant under Articles 2.2 and 3.3. How will the
certainty-consensus determination help the given panel in evaluating the
"rational relationship" standard that these Articles require? 174 In determining
whether such a rational relationship exists, WTO judges have emphasized the
importance of considering the "quality and quantity of scientific evidence."'
' 75
The Appellate Body has held elsewhere that the SPS Agreement "does not
require that the risk assessment must necessarily embody only the view of a
majority of the relevant scientific community," and that "[i]n some cases, the
very existence of divergent views presented by qualified scientists who have
investigated the particular issue at hand may indicate a state of scientific
uncertainty.
176
When dispute settlement panels seek to decide whether a measure is
rationally related to science, it is crucial that they consider where the risk
situation falls on the certainty-consensus continuum. When faced with low-
certainty, low-consensus issues, dispute panels should take a more deferential
circumstances actually requires extensive, regular dialogue with the public. This approach is permitted
under existing interpretations of the treaty language. Although the SPS Agreement establishes a number
of required technical factors in a risk assessment, the Appellate Body in Hormones has made it clear that
this is not an exhaustive list. Id. para. 187. Rather, risk assessment can include "factors which are not
susceptible of quantitative analysis by the empirical or experimental laboratory methods commonly
associated with the physical sciences." Id. para. 2536). Nor does risk assessment, as defined by the SPS
Agreement, require the scientific establishment of some sort of a minimum threshold of quantifiable
risk: "Neither Articles 5.1 and 5.2 nor Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement require a risk assessment to
establish a minimum quantifiable magnitude of risk." Id. Likewise, the requirements of harm
identification and likelihood evaluation required by Article 5.1 as discussed in Salmon do nothing to
require rigid processes of quantification. In Salmon, the Appellate Body stated that risk assessment
within the meaning of Article 5.1 must:
(1) identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread a member wants to prevent
within its territory, as well as the potential biological and economic consequences
associated with the entry, establishment or spread of these diseases;
(2) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases, as well as
the associated potential biological and economic consequences; and
(3) evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases according to
the SPS measures which might be applied.
Salmon, AB, supra note 61, para. 121. Accordingly, the SPS Agreement, as it has been interpreted,
creates a space for public input as a possible component in formal risk assessment. Factoring in public
values would seem to be not only appropriate, but also necessary in risk situations of low certainty and
low consensus.
174. The SPS Agreement states: "Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary
measure as applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based
on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided
for in paragraph 7 of Article 5." SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 2.2. The Appellate Body has
interpreted this language to require that "there be a rational and objective relationship between the SPS
measure and the scientific evidence" and that "[t]he context of the word 'sufficient' or, more generally,
the phrase 'maintained without sufficient scientific evidence' in Article 2.2, includes Article 5.1 as well
as Articles 3.3 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement." Japanese Varietals, AB, supra note 62, paras. 74 & 84.
The Appellate Body has also said that "scientific justification" in Article 3.3 requires that there be a
"rational relationship between the SPS measure at issue and the available scientific information." Id.
para. 79.
175. Japanese Varietals, AB, supra note 62, para. 84 ("Whether there is a rational relationship
between an SPS measure and the scientific evidence is to be determined on a case-by-case basis and will
depend upon the particular circumstances of the case, including the characteristics of the measure at
issue and the quality and quantity of the scientific evidence."); see also Japanese Apples, AB, supra note
53, para. 162.
176. Hormones, AB, supra note 60, para 194.
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approach to the science-based decision-making of members, and should
consider public participation as having been a legitimate input during the risk-
assessment and risk-management process in question. Where certainty and
consensus are at low or even medium levels, regulators must be allowed to
take public value choices into consideration when setting appropriate
regulatory standards. Indeed, this power falls within the scope of their treaty-
given discretion to set appropriate levels as defined in footnote 2 of Article
3.3. 177 In short, judges must make a determination of the plausibility of
members' use of science in light of scientific and social facts, both of which
have a bearing on the issues of consensus and certainty. When such conditions
of low or even medium certainty and consensus obtain, a wider array of
science policy decisions and regulatory interventions may be seen as plausibly
based on the scientific evidence available. When consensus and certainty are
high, the range of rational measures to address the risk situation should be
more limited.
VI. CONCLUSIONS FOR BIOTECHPRODUCTS
Finally, we turn our attention to the particular facts and circumstances of
the Biotech Products case at the WTO. We examine information relevant to
the question of where GMOs should be located on the certainty-consensus
continuum, and argue that they create a low certainty-low consensus risk
situation: risk-assessment techniques associated with GMOs remain
scientifically and politically contested both within and across different
national regulatory systems. Consequently, we argue that the EU's challenged
measures satisfy the temporary safe harbor test under Article 5.7. The EU
should therefore be allowed to conduct further risk assessment before being
forced to litigate its ultimate position on GMOs before the dispute settlement
panel. 1
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A. GMO Risk Assessment Is Marked by Low Certainty and Low Consensus
GMOs constitute a clear example of a low-certainty, low-consensus
situation. The persistence of an international stalemate in establishing risk-
177. The SPS Agreement defines the requirement of scientific justification the following way:
[T]here is a scientific justification if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation of
available scientific information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this
Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international standards, guidelines or
recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection.
SPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 3.3 n.2 (emphasis added).
178. As a practical matter, ever since the alleged moratorium began, the European Commission
and EU member states have continued to engage in fact-finding, scientific review, and public dialogue,
which resulted in the passage of the new labeling regime for GM foods that was enacted earlier this
year. See European Parliament & Council Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 32, at 33. As approvals for
biotech products have begun once again, it seems that at least for some, this labeling regime will
constitute the ultimate (as opposed to provisional) regulatory treatment of GMOs in the EU. It remains
an open question whether the United States and the other complaining WTO members in Biotech
Products will choose to challenge this new labeling regime under the SPS or other WTO agreements,
and whether such a labeling regime would even qualify as a measure under the SPS Agreement, let
alone pass muster under the science-based provisions.
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assessment guidelines for GMOs, the emergence of an international
precautionary norm, and the existence of ongoing regulatory learning within
the United States itself all strongly support this characterization.
First, the long-lasting stalemate at the Codex over the risk-assessment
methodology for GMOs is a strong indication of a low-certainty, low-
consensus situation. Since 1996, the Codex has recognized that the risk
assessment of whole-food products containing GMOs, or products involving
recombinant DNA in the production process, requires a unique risk-
assessment framework. 179 However, for years this initiative remained locked
in a political and scientific stalemate. After seven years of intensive and
politically contested work, the Codex finally adopted its Principles for the
Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern Biotechnology in July 2003.180
The new recommended framework includes, inter alia, a "Description of the
Donor Organism[s]," a detailed "Characterization of the Genetic
Modification," an "Evaluation of Metabolites," and an assessment of
"Nutritional Modification."'
181
The fact that the Codex labored intensively for seven years before being
able to agree on risk-analysis guidelines for biotech foods indicates the extent
to which the risk analysis of GMOs has been a contested scientific and
political endeavor. Large differences in public values regarding health and the
environment are operating in the GMO domain, differences that are relevant
not only to the management of hazards, but also to their initial definition,
characterization, and assessment. As a result, governments have not framed
the scientific issues posed by technological developments in the same ways, as
the divergences between product-based and process-based approaches and
between health-focused and environment-focused approaches illustrate. 182
Compounding this issue is the fact that GMOs represent an emergent suite of
technologies whose biological properties and environmental and social
impacts are neither well-defined nor certain. Indeed, there may not be
agreement even on an unambiguous characterization of the technological risk-
agent itself.183 Different framings reflect the beliefs and preferences operating
in different societies.1
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179. See Anne A. MacKenzie, The Process of Developing Labeling Standards for GM Foods in
the Codex Alimentarius, 3 AGBIoFORUM 203 (2000). The twenty-third session of the Codex, held in the
summer of 1999 in Rome, established the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived from
Biotechnology to develop standards, guidelines, or recommendations for foods derived from
biotechnology or traits introduced into foods by biotechnology. See Food & Agric. Org. of the UN, Task
Force analyses [sic] the Risks of Foods Derived from Biotechnology, Mar. 14, 2000, at
http://www.fao.org/NEWS/2000/000304-e.htm.
180. CODEX AD Hoc INTERGOVERNMENTAL TASK FORCE ON FOODS DERIVED FROM
BIOTECHNOLOGY, CODEX PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON FOODS DERIVED FROM BIOTECHNOLOGY
(2003), available at http://www.bgvv.de/cm/208/codexprinciples-andguidelines-on-foods-derived-
_frombiotechnology.pdf.
181. Id. at9-14.
182. See supra Part II; see also SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE (forthcoming 2005).
183. For example, with GM plants, the precise insertion of the foreign gene is recognized not to
be rigorously controlled in practice, leading to uncertainties about the precise biological agent which has
been created and released in commercial planting. Further development of the scientific understanding
of these processes would presumably reduce uncertainty of this kind, increasing the reliability of risk
assessment. Cf Hae-Woon Choi et al., High Frequency Cytogenetic Aberration in Transgenic Oat
(Avena Sativa L.) Plants, 160 PLANT SCI. 763 (2001).
184. See LIBERATORE, supra note 93, at 225-47.
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Second, in addition to the efforts of the Codex mentioned above, public
debate and input have been instrumental in the creation of a new international
regulatory regime for GMOs, one that embraces a precautionary approach to
managing risk because of the insufficiency of existing knowledge. During the
period of the alleged EU moratorium, popular political pressure mounted in
countries throughout the world for an international agreement on regulating
transgenic organisms. On January 29, 2000, the representatives of 129
countries met in Montreal and adopted the Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety,
an act capping over five years of negotiations regarding the international
transport of GMOs.18 5 Negotiated under the auspices of the 1992 Convention
on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Environmental Programme, the
Protocol regulates the transnational movement of the living products of
biotechnology in order to protect biodiversity. 1 There was intense public
debate and discussion about the scope and importance of the precautionar
principle in relation to GM technologies during the Protocol's negotiation. 
7
The discussions served as a forum for international informational exchange
regarding GM technologies, and the robustness of GMO risk-assessment
methodologies. It is notable that the negotiating states reached consensus on
the issue of precaution, and the final language of the Protocol states:
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information and
knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a living modified
organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of
import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from
taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified
organism in question as referred to in paragraph 3 above, in order to avoid or minimize
such potential adverse effects.
1
88
Although the United States is not a signatory to the Cartagena Protocol,
the emergence of broad support for the agreement throughout the rest of the
world highlights the fact that simple risk assessment is inadequate for the
GMO case. More time is necessary for the development and implementation
of regulatory solutions. Indeed, the rigid specification of a particular mode of
risk assessment would tend to freeze the ongoing development of risk-
assessment science and policy in the GMO area (as visible in the United
States as it is in Europe). An overly rigid conception of proper regulation in
this area could lead to inadequate risk assessments in the future, threaten
human populations or environments, and undermine the legitimacy of the SPS
Agreement.
Finally, the United States itself has reversed its regulatory policy for
GMOs over the period of the alleged moratorium, as the StarLink, Prodigene,
and GM Bentgrass incidents discussed above illustrate.
185. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000,
U.N. Doe. UNEPICBD/ExCOP/I!3, reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1027, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp. The Protocol referred to living biotechnology products as
"living modified organisms."
186. See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, A Nexus of Trade and the Environment: The
Relationship Between the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the SPS Agreement of the World Trade
Organization, 14 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 2 (2003).
187. Id. at 16-22.
188. Supra note 133, art. 10.6.
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Together, these factors amply demonstrate that the case of GM products
lies squarely within the zone we define as low-certainty, low-consensus.
B. The EU Should Be Able to Take Advantage of Article 5. 7's Temporary
Safe Harbor
It should be concluded that EU authorities can legitimately invoke the
provisionality clause and can satisfy the "undue delay" standard of Annex C.
The terms "undue" and "reasonable" are legal standards that are meaningless
without a comparison of what happened in the particular instance with what is
believed to be the general tendency in like situations. 189 The proper inquiry for
WTO judges, therefore, is one that is comparative in nature. Far from being a
period of delay, the years from 1998 to the present have been characterized by
intense social and scientific learning about GM products and their
implications both within the EU and elsewhere. Although six years may be
deemed an unreasonable amount of time for provisional measures in other risk
situations, it seems reasonable in the GMO case in light of the relevant
evidence. As we have already discussed above, a succession of authoritative
studies on both GM crops and science and environmental regulation have
tended to add further substance to the concerns that have been under
review. 190 Furthermore, it was the dynamic interaction among agencies,
scientists, and the public-facilitated by the provisional measures-that led to
methodological and scientific development in the effective risk assessment of
GMOs.
VII. CONCLUSION
As we have suggested throughout the discussion, the judicial approach
outlined above admittedly entails a number of possible disadvantages,
especially from the perspective of trade liberalization. WTO validation of
multiple approaches to the assessment of particular products could, at best,
cause delay for the larger project of regulatory standardization; at worst, it
could open new avenues for protectionism masquerading as risk-based
technology policy. A subtler version of this critique is that increasing the
evidentiary burden necessary to establish a violation of the science-based
provisions, or widening the scope of affirmative defenses, might decrease the
sharpness of the SPS Agreement's anti-protectionist tools.
In our view, careful implementation of our approach to reviewing
science policy decision-making would not jeopardize the efficacy of world
trade law in the short term and could build political legitimacy in the long
189. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 157 (1958).
190. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOLOGICAL CONFINEMENT OF GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED ORGANISMS (2004); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ECOLOGICAL MONITORING OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS: A WORKSHOP SUMMARY (2001); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS: THE SCOPE AND ADEQUACY OF REGULATION (2002);
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND
REGULATION (2000); ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA, ELEMENTS OF PRECAUTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE REGULATION OF FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY IN CANADA: AN EXPERT PANEL REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF
FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY (2001), available at http://www.rsc.ca/foodbiotechnology/GMreportEN.pdf.
2005]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30:81
term. As a threshold matter, it is important to remember that the structure of
the world trading regime embodies the approach of embedded liberalism, and
the SPS Agreement itself explicitly rejects the proposition that what is deemed
to be necessary environmental and health regulation should be dictated to
WTO members. To a large extent, regulatory diversity across environmental
and health domains results from real cultural differences about the extent and
character of risks. Furthermore, as in national federations like the United
States, diversity itself might be beneficial from the perspective of creating a
laboratory for testing the efficacy of regulatory approaches.
The proper direction for judicial doctrine, then, will be to enhance the
sensitivity of judicial tools for detecting protectionism masquerading as health
and environmental values, while preserving cultural autonomy in important
societal domains. Reading public participation into the SPS Agreement would
increase the WTO's sensitivity both to the socially embedded nature of the
science used in risk assessment and to non-protectionist cultural differences.
Consistent with the goals of embedded liberalism, our approach encourages
judicial deference toward expressions of objectively documented public will
in member states, especially in novel risk situations characterized by low
certainty and low consensus. Furthermore, administrative review, including
implementation of standards of transparency, would enable judges to
distinguish legitimate forms of local regulatory sensibility from protectionism
by requiring reasoned decision-making that takes the presence, absence, and
substance of scientific evidence and expressed cultural values into account.
Implementing this judicial approach under the SPS Agreement would
help avoid the pitfall of using the authority of science, rather than the principle
of nondiscrimination, to decide whether regulations stricter than international
standards are legitimate. As other trade law commentators have pointed out,
such a rigid science-based view would have the perverse effect of removing
the ultimate power of decision from the democratic communities that the SPS
measures purport to protect.' 9
Our approach could help mitigate this danger of a widening democracy
deficit at the WTO in a number of ways. First, as we have argued above, our
approach would help incorporate the legitimacy of public participation in risk-
based decision-making within the trading system. If discrepant risk framing
and public values are viewed as justified and necessary inputs not only to risk
management, but also to risk assessment, and if public acceptance is taken as
an important measure of the reliability and conclusiveness of the risk
assessment, then the dangers of using science to trample upon peoples' real
concerns about health and the environment will be minimized. Furthermore,
the application of the certainty-consensus framework will help prevent the
appropriation of the regulatory functions of sovereign nation states in domains
of contested values and risk analysis. Finally, by enforcing a proceduralist
approach to the review of science-based decision-making, the WTO can serve
a useful role in recognizing and reinforcing a robust conception of deliberative
democracy within member states, one that would enhance accountability
191. Howse, supra note 13, at 2357; Walker, supra note 6, at 277-96; Wirth, supra note 55, at
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between national regulatory agencies and the public. Most importantly, our
approach would not foreclose the attempt to pool collective knowledge as a
resource for the harmonization of standards: in situations of high consensus
and high certainty, a heavier burden will be placed on members to establish
that their measures stem from non-protectionist values.
To the extent that our proposal enhances democratic control of novel
technologies, the trading regime will be strengthened. Free trade need not
mean running roughshod over deeply held political and cultural values. In an
age of globalization in which anxieties about cultural homogenization and
non-accountability of global governance are endemic, the political advantages
of such an approach are obvious. The scientific advantages of creating a space
for public participation in national science policymaking may be less obvious,
but they are no less significant. Indeed, as we have seen in the case of GMOs,
public input can have the effect of identifying relevant and crucial scientific
questions, problems, and hypotheses. As a result, science aimed at risk
assessment will be more vigorous, both intellectually and socially.
Recognizing the substance of public dialogue and the actions of civil society
as important components within the risk-based decision-making process will
help expand frontiers of useful knowledge in these areas, as well as prevent
the selective uptake and imposition of a single member's science policies on
others in culturally sensitive matters of contested values. Such an approach
would not only avoid well-documented problems of scientific competency at
the WTO, 192 but would also, if properly carried out, help ensure that
legitimate and democratically enacted science policies do not fall prey to a
procrustean pursuit of regulatory harmonization.
192. See, e.g., Christoforou, Settlement of Science-Based Trade Disputes in the WTO, supra
note 67, at 622-23.
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